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Abstract: Autonomous vehicles are widely expected to save tens of thousands of
lives each year by making car crashes attributable to human error – currently
the overwhelming majority of fatal crashes – a thing of the past. How the legal
system should attribute responsibility for the (hopefully few) crashes autonomous vehicles cause is an open and hotly debated question.
Most tort scholars approach this question by asking what liability rule is
most likely to achieve the desired policy outcome: promoting the adoption of
this lifesaving technology without destroying manufacturers’ incentives to optimize it. This approach has led to a wide range of proposals, many of which
suggest replacing standard rules of products liability with some new system
crafted specifically for autonomous vehicles and creating immunity or absolute
liability or something in between.
But, I argue, the relative safety of autonomous vehicles should not be relevant
in determining whether and in what ways manufacturers are held liable for their
crashes. The history of products liability litigation over motor vehicle design
shows that the tort system has been hesitant to indulge in such comparisons, as
it generally declines both to impose liability on older, more dangerous cars simply
because they lack the latest safety features and to grant immunity to newer, safer
cars simply because of their superior aggregate performance. These are instances
in which products liability law fails to promote efficient outcomes and instead
provides redress for those who have been wronged by defective products.
Applying these ideas to the four fatalities that have so far been caused by
autonomous vehicles suggests that just as conventional vehicles should not be
considered defective in relying on a human driver, autonomous vehicles should
not be immune when their defects cause injury.
Keywords: autonomous vehicles, Products Liability, products liability litigation,
tort law
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Introduction
Car crashes are the leading cause of death for Americans aged 18 to 24, and they
kill roughly 40,000 people every year. The vast majority of those deaths – about
94%, by one estimate – are caused by one or another form of human error,1 a
seemingly intractable problem. By either supplanting or complementing human
driving with automated features that are capable of controlling various aspects
of the driving task, autonomous vehicles will someday eliminate virtually all of
these crashes, ushering in a new world of safety and convenience.
Despite the fact that fully autonomous vehicles2 are not yet commercially
available, their development has already attracted enormous attention. To many
commentators, automobile accidents caused by autonomous vehicles will raise
new problems for our system of tort law. These problems, it is thought, chiefly
concern whether, to what degree, and by what standards manufacturers of
autonomous vehicles will be liable for car crashes. This is a subject of great
import not just for the manufacturers themselves but for society as a whole,
given the shared interest in hastening the adoption of such potentially lifesaving technology.
Almost all of the scholarly literature on autonomous vehicles adopts as a
major premise the idea that autonomous vehicles will be significantly safer than
traditional vehicles. This helps frame as a problem the possibility that autonomous vehicle manufacturers will be liable to their customers for whatever
crashes they cannot eliminate. A second major premise of the scholarly literature is that the machine learning algorithms3 that make up the heart (or,
perhaps more appropriately, the brain) of autonomous vehicles will exhibit
behavior that is inscrutable and thus not possible to describe as defective. For

1 SANTOKH SINGH, NHTSA, DOT HS 812 115, CRITICAL REASONS FOR CRASHES INVESTIGATED IN
NATIONAL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH CAUSATION SURVEY 1 (2015), available at: https://crash
stats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812115.
2 “Fully” or “highly” autonomous vehicles are designed to perform all aspects of the driving
task, in contrast to low-level automation features like antilock brakes and cruise control that are
only designed to perform discrete tasks in certain situations. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, Automated Vehicles 3.0: Preparing for the Future of Transportation vi (2018),
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/policy-initiatives/automated-vehicles/
320711/preparing-future-transportation-automated-vehicle-30.pdf (last visited June 20, 2019).
3 Machine learning “refers to computer algorithms that are able to automatically ‘learn’ or
improve in performance on some task over time” meaning that “the computer learns the ‘rules’
to guide its actions on its own, rather than having those rules pre-programmed by human
programmers.” Harry Surden & Mary-Anne Williams, Technological Opacity, Predictability, and
Self-Driving Cars, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 147–48 (2016).
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these reasons, many scholars propose wholly new systems for handling autonomous vehicle liability, from immunity to absolute liability in the form of
compulsory insurance. There are reasons to be skeptical of both of these premises. As a statistical matter, highly autonomous vehicles will need to log orders
of magnitude more miles before their safety record can be meaningfully compared with that of human drivers. It is also not clear that their behavior will be
so opaque as to baffle any effort to apply existing tort concepts in evaluating it
after it crashes.
More importantly, products liability law has always hesitated to evaluate the
defectiveness of products by reference to other products (as opposed to alternative designs of the same product, a distinction that has always been blurry).
With each of the incremental improvements that have cumulatively revolutionized automobile safety in the past half century, products liability has frequently
declined to impose liability on manufacturers for their failure to include cutting
edge safety technology and, conversely, has declined to immunize manufacturers of defective safety technology simply because it may still make cars safer
overall than they once were. The way products liability law has defined defect in
design cases, its hostility to category liability and requirement of a reasonable
alternative design, and its treatment of custom evidence all suggest that autonomous vehicle manufacturers should not be immunized from liability for selling
defective products just because they improve upon the frustratingly dismal
performance of human drivers. Contrary to the majority of legal scholarship
that has so far explored this issue, I argue that the relative safety of autonomous
vehicles as compared with conventional ones should be irrelevant in evaluating
their liability in tort.
This article begins by surveying the current state of autonomous vehicle
development, with particular emphasis on the four fatalities that have so far
been caused by cars operating autonomously. Part II.A then draws on the history
of products liability cases involving the design of automobiles and argues that
the tort system has traditionally evaluated automobile safety technology on its
own merits, largely without reference to whether it makes cars safer in the
aggregate than those that preceded them. Parts II.B and C then use these
doctrinal lessons to argue that in these instances, tort law declines to impose
liability in ways that would promote economic efficiency and instead provides
redress to those who have been wrongfully injured by defective products.
Finally, Part III applies these ideas to the four autonomous vehicle fatalities
that have so far occurred, arguing that manufacturers in each case could
plausibly be said to have sold defective products whose accidents should raise
at least the possibility of liability.
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I Factual background
A The current state of autonomous vehicle development
Highly autonomous vehicles have been imagined for decades, but only recently,
thanks to advances in artificial intelligence programming, computing power,
and sensor technology, have they been seen as anything other than a distant
dream. The past decade has seen a wave of optimism and hubris surrounding
the development of autonomous vehicles followed by a trough of pessimism and
caution that arguably best characterizes the current moment. All along there
have been two competing models for the development of autonomous vehicles,
a “sea-change” model and a more gradual, “incremental” model.

1 The sea-change model
For the better part of the past decade, autonomous vehicles were thought to be a
technology whose arrival could be expected imminently. Executives of companies working on autonomous vehicle development confidently predicted that
autonomous vehicles would whisk us around cities by the year 20174 and built
cars without pedals or steering wheels. In the press, think pieces and books
explored the myriad implications of this new technology for urban land use,
public transit systems, the energy grid, greenhouse gas emissions, the insurance
industry, residential and commercial architecture, and virtually every other
aspect of the modern economy and built environment.5
The sea-change model envisioned a leap from the traditional, primarily
human-operated vehicles we know today to highly autonomous, futuristic
vehicles operated chiefly or even exclusively by artificial intelligence. On the
Society of Automotive Engineers’ 5 level spectrum of autonomy, these vehicles
represent Levels 4 and 5 automation, meaning that they are capable of handling
the “driving task” without human oversight or attention, freeing human
4 Donna Tam, Google’s Sergey Brin: You’ll ride in robot cars within 5 years, CNET, https://www.
cnet.com/news/googles-sergey-brin-youll-ride-in-robot-cars-within-5-years/ (last visited June
20, 2019).
5 See, e. g. ANNALISA MEYBOOM & LORINC VASS, DRIVERLESS URBAN FUTURES: A SPECULATIVE
ATLAS FOR AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES (2019); SAMUEL I. SCHWARTZ & KAREN KELLY, NO ONE AT
THE WHEEL: DRIVERLESS CARS AND THE ROAD OF THE FUTURE (2018); ANDREAS HERRMANN,
WALTER BRENNER & RUPERT STADLER, AUTONOMOUS DRIVING: HOW THE DRIVERLESS
REVOLUTION WILL CHANGE THE WORLD (2018).
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passengers to do other things. (The difference between Level 4 and 5 automation
is that Level 5 automation can be expected to work in “all conditions,” whereas
Level 4 only requires that the vehicle perform all driving functions under
“certain conditions.”)6
Several companies have made substantial bets on the sea-change model.
Waymo, which began life in 2009 as a project within Google’s X lab and became
a standalone subsidiary in 2016, has always pursued this path, and is today
widely considered to be the leader in the field. In 2014, Google revealed a fully
functioning prototype autonomous vehicle called the Firefly that lacked a steering wheel and pedals, which it announced it would begin testing on public
streets. More recently, Waymo has used standard vehicles retrofitted with sensors in a range of environments, from Arizona to Michigan. Most of this testing is
overseen by a human driver who is capable of interrupting the computer program if necessary. Waymo also operates an autonomous taxi service in the
Phoenix suburb of Chandler, Arizona. When the program was first announced,
in November 2017, it was limited to a 100-square mile area and to pre-selected
members of Waymo’s “Early Rider” program.7 The program, called Waymo One,
now operates as a ride-hailing service in Tempe, Mesa, and Gilbert (in addition
to Chandler), but it is still only available to about 1,000 pre-approved customers,
although it has a list of “tens of thousands” waiting to join.8
Uber, too, has in a sense bet its future on achieving Level 4 or 5 automation
within the next few years. After its highly anticipated initial public offering, the
company has been under enormous pressure from the investing public to
become profitable (it currently loses around a billion dollars a quarter).9 One
of its key strategies in this effort is eliminating the driver, to whom it currently
pays a substantial portion of every fare.10 To that end, Uber has been investing
6 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, supra note 2.
7 Andrew J. Hawkins, Waymo is first to put fully self-driving cars on US roads without a safety
driver, THE VERGE (2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/11/7/16615290/waymo-self-drivingsafety-driver-chandler-autonomous (last visited June 20, 2019).
8 Alan Ohnsman, Hand Gestures And Horses: Waymo’s Self-Driving Service Learns To Woo The
Public, FORBES, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/alanohnsman/2019/05/19/waymo-sixmonth-checkup-headway-on-hand-gestures-and-cops-on-slow-ride-to-self-driving-future/ (last
visited June 20, 2019).
9 Eliot Brown, Wall Street Isn’t Buying What Silicon Valley Is Selling, WALL ST J., May 25, 2019,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/wall-street-isnt-buying-what-silicon-valley-is-selling-11558756810
(last visited June 20, 2019).
10 Exactly how much of the fare is paid to drivers varies by region and even by individual ride.
See Kathleen Pender, How much of your fare goes to Uber and Lyft drivers? You’d be surprised,
S.F. CHRON., May 9, 2019, https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/networth/article/For-a-drivers-pay-what-s-fair-in-an-Uber-13830931.php (last visited August 14, 2019).
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heavily in developing autonomous taxis much like those used by Waymo One.
Uber suffered a significant setback when one of its autonomous vehicles struck
and killed a pedestrian in March 2018, an event that will be discussed in greater
detail below.11
The sea-change model excites the imagination. Although public opinion
surveys routinely report that most of us are afraid to ride in a car driven by a
robot,12 many are eager to imagine the ways highly autonomous vehicles would
change the world. Most obviously, autonomous driving would theoretically eliminate the majority of car accidents, saving tens of thousands of lives per year and
preventing hundreds of thousands of injuries and their associated economic toll.13
Without the fear of crashes, cars could be designed without things like crumple
zones, seatbelts, and airbags, freeing designers to imagine living rooms (or even
bedrooms) on wheels.14 Time spent commuting by car could be just as productive
as time spent at a desk. Driverless cars could also drive in closely packed
“platoons,” optimizing aerodynamics like Tour de France cyclists to improve
fuel economy, reduce emissions, and increase the capacity of highways.15

11 See infra Part I.A.3.b. In addition to Waymo and Uber, a host of other companies are
pursuing autonomous driving under the sea-change model, including Apple and Uber’s chief
rival, Lyft. Vindu Goel, Apple Gets Permit to Test Self-Driving Cars in California, N.Y. TIMES, April
14, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/14/technology/apple-self-driving-car-permit.html?
searchResultPosition=1 (last visited September 4, 2019); Mike Isaac, Playing Catch-Up to Uber on
Self-Driving, Lyft Teams Up With Partners, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/06/06/technology/lyft-self-driving-nutonomy-partnership.html (last visited September 4,
2019).
12 Keith Naughton, Americans Still Fear Self-Driving Cars, BLOOMBERG, March 13, 2019, https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-14/americans-still-fear-self-driving-cars (last visited August 20, 2019).
13 See Jerry Albright et al., KPMG, Marketplace of Change: Automobile Insurance in the Era of
Autonomous Vehicles 26 (October 2015), available at: https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/
pdf/2016/06/id-market-place-of-change-automobile-insurance-in-the-era-of-autonomousvehicles.pdf (predicting 80 % potential reduction in accident frequency per vehicle); Michelle
Bertoncello & Dominik Wee, McKinsey & Co., Ten Ways Autonomous Driving Could Redefine the
Automotive World (June 2015) (predicting that widespread adoption of autonomous vehicles
could eliminate up to 90 % of crashes); Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving and Product
Liability, 2017 MICH. ST L. REV. 1, 15 (2017) (“Automated driving systems may avoid many of the
errors . . . that contribute to some 94% of crashes.”).
14 Vlad Savov, Volvo’s 360c concept car is a fully autonomous bedroom on wheels, THE VERGE,
2018, https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/5/17822398/volvos-360c-concept-autonomous-car-elec
tric-future (last visited August 20, 2019).
15 HERRMANN, BRENNER, AND STADLER, supra note 5, at 163–64.
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Advocates imagine cities without parking lots, as the autonomous Uber that drove
you to work would not need to wait outside for eight hours until it’s time to head
home.16 This great liberation of urban land would help ameliorate the national
housing crisis.17 Even the airline industry is thought to be at risk.18

2 The incremental model
The feverish optimism of the sea-change model has more recently given way to a
kind of glum practicality.19 Executives are now more commonly heard expressing
caution and asking for patience, and the idea of fully autonomous vehicles
operating on a broad scale by 2020 now looks like a fantasy.20 Indeed, when
Elon Musk recently suggested that Tesla’s dire financial situation would be
ameliorated by the launch of a robo-taxi service in 2020,21 he was met with
ridicule.22 Many experts now acknowledge that full autonomy could be “the

16 MEYBOOM AND VASS, supra note 5, at 126–37.
17 Wolf Richter, How self-driving cars could completely reshape the housing market, BUSINESS
INSIDER, 2017, https://www.businessinsider.com/self-driving-cars-effect-on-housing-market2017-9 (last visited August 20, 2019).
18 Stephen Rice & Scott Winter, Driverless cars are coming for the airlines, FAST COMPANY, June
10, 2019, https://www.fastcompany.com/90362158/autonomous-cars-are-coming-for-the-air
lines (last visited August 14, 2019).
19 Lawrence Ulrich, Driverless Cars May Be Coming, but Let’s Not Get Carried Away, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, June 21, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/business/self-driving-carscadillac-super-cruise.html (last visited June 21, 2019) (quoting director of Toyota Research
Institute referring to “the current ‘trough of disillusionment’ in autonomy”).
20 Id. (“[W]e’ve tried to turn down the hype and make people understand how hard this is.”);
Neal E. Boudette, Despite High Hopes, Self-Driving Cars Are ‘Way in the Future,’ N.Y. TIMES, July
17, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/business/self-driving-autonomous-cars.html
(last visited July 17, 2019) (“Several carmakers and technology companies have concluded
that making autonomous vehicles is going to be harder, slower and costlier than they
thought.”).
21 Dalvin Brown, Elon Musk says Tesla owners could make $30,000 in robotaxi network, USA
TODAY, April 23, 2019, https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2019/04/23/elon-musk-says-teslaowners-could-make-30-000-robotaxi-network/3549652002/ (last visited June 20, 2019).
22 Emily Stewart, Tesla’s 2020 self-driving car promise sounds too good to be true because it is,
VOX (2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/4/23/18513045/tesla-robotaxi-earnings-elon-musk (last
visited June 20, 2019) (quoting experts referring to Musk’s claims as “totally off-base” and “half
baked”); Christopher Mims, Self-Driving Cars Have a Problem: Safer Human-Driven Ones, WALL
STREET JOURNAL, June 15, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/self-driving-cars-have-a-problemsafer-human-driven-ones-11560571203 (last visited June 15, 2019) (describing Musk’s goal as
“something few analysts believe is feasible”).
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hardest engineering problem in our time,” one whose solution seems to require
more effort the closer it gets.23 In a lecture at MIT, Waymo’s director of engineering said that although driverless cars were “90% done,” they “still have 90% to
go” because the first “90% of the technology takes 10% of the time.”24 Several
recent analyses have predicted that only around 10% of vehicles will be fully
autonomous by 2030.25
Recognizing these challenges, many companies have pursued a more incremental approach to autonomous driving.26 Instead of pursuing a Level 4 or 5
autonomous vehicle without human controls, some manufacturers have developed standalone technologies designed to work in tandem with human drivers
at Level 1 or 2 automation and often offered as optional features on high-end
cars that are already being sold today.27
Cars have long included features properly characterized as somewhat autonomous. Anti-lock braking automatically modulates the application of brakes
during sudden stops to prevent cars from skidding. Electronic stability control
detects loss of traction from abrupt changes in direction and automatically
applies brakes to one or more of the wheels as needed to correct the vehicle’s
course. Incremental development along these lines continues, and has gotten
increasingly futuristic. Many cars now feature “automatic emergency braking,”
which monitors the road in front of the car and applies the brakes without any
input from the driver when it detects an imminent collision. The Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety estimates that automatic emergency braking
reduces rear end crashes by 50% and crashes with injuries by 56%; the

23 John D. Stoll, Driverless Cars Are 90% Here. Another 90% Is Left to Go., WALL STREET
JOURNAL, May 24, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/driverless-cars-are-90-here-theresanother-90-left-to-go-11558717322 (last visited June 15, 2019).
24 Id.; Stephen Wilmot, The Long, Shared Road to Driverless Cars, WALL STREET JOURNAL,
March 18, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-long-shared-road-to-driverless-cars11552919131 (last visited June 21, 2019) (noting that “the arrival date of profit-generating selfdriving vehicles keeps getting pushed back” and that “[s]elf-driving technology will be a drain
on the resources of tech companies and car makers alike for the foreseeable future”).
25 Mims, supra note 22.
26 Ulrich, supra note 19 (describing “growing consensus that driver-free transport will begin
with a trickle, not a flood”).
27 In Level 1 automation, the driver and the automated system share control of the vehicle.
Classic examples include cruise control and lane keeping assistance, both of which are
designed to augment rather than replace human driving. In Level 2 automation, the automated
system takes full control of the vehicle, but the driver is expected to monitor the system’s
driving and be prepared to retake control at a moment’s notice. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, supra note 2, at vi.
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National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) estimates that it can reduce fatalities and injuries resulting from rear-end crashes by 80%.28
Several carmakers are taking aim at distracted driving, which accounted for
about 9% of traffic fatalities – 3,166 lives – in 2017.29 Volvo plans to introduce
cameras that monitor drivers’ eyes and “send an alert or even limit a car’s speed
whenever its driver’s eyes are averted for too long.”30 Subaru’s similar system will
beep if drivers’ eyelids droop.31 Cadillac’s Super Cruise – available since 2017 on
its luxury sedan – is an outlier.32 Like several other high-end cars, the Cadillac can
steer and modulate speed to keep the car in a lane at a safe distance from traffic in
front.33 What sets the Cadillac Super Cruise apart is its awareness of its own
limitations. Unlike, notably, Tesla, Cadillac has designed the Super Cruise so that
it cannot be activated unless it is on limited-access highways that Cadillac has
already mapped at fine detail.34 It also monitors its driver’s eyes and issues
warnings if the driver gets distracted.35 With technologies like these, it is possible
that manufacturers will be able to achieve many of the safety gains offered by
autonomy without necessarily solving the much harder problem of eliminating the
human driver altogether.

3 Autonomous crashes
Much of the early scholarship on autonomous vehicles dealt with the subject on
an almost purely hypothetical basis. In addressing who would be liable in the
event of an autonomous crash, scholars were forced to imagine how exactly
such a crash could occur. There have now been four fatalities in the United
States attributable at least in part to autonomous vehicles, all of which have

28 Mims, supra note 22. Thanks to a voluntary commitment by twenty auto makers, “nearly all”
new cars in the U.S. will have automatic emergency braking by 2020. Id.
29 Adrienne Roberts, Car Companies Sharpen Focus on Curbing Distracted Driving, WALL STREET
JOURNAL, June 15, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/car-companies-sharpen-focus-on-curb
ing-distracted-driving-11560591000 (last visited June 15, 2019).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Patrick Olsen, Cadillac Tops Tesla in Consumer Reports’ First Ranking of Automated Driving
Systems, CONSUMER REPORTS, October 4, 2018, at 4.
33 Id. (describing systems developed by Volvo, Nissan, Cadillac, and Tesla).
34 Id.
35 Id.; Ulrich, supra note 19 (describing Cadillac’s “digital disciplinarian that makes drivers sit
straight and keep eyes up front”).
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helped shed light on the ways in which autonomous vehicles can kill and the
liability issues that result.36
a Tesla
Three of the four fatal crashes involving autonomous vehicles have killed drivers
of Teslas, all of whom were using a suite of features the company calls
“Autopilot.” The first of these, widely reported as the first autonomous vehicle
fatality, occurred in Willison, Florida in May 2016 and attracted enormous media
attention. The driver, Joshua Brown, was travelling along a highway at 74 miles
per hour (the speed limit was 65) and was killed instantly when he collided head
on with a tractor-trailer that was making a left turn across his path. The NTSB
issued a 63-page report about the incident, which cast some blame on virtually
every party involved.37 As for the truck driver, the NTSB found that the Tesla was
well within his line of sight when he initiated his left hand turn across the its
path, and that he should he should have waited until there was no oncoming
traffic.38
Untangling the responsibility of Tesla and Brown is substantially trickier, and
requires a somewhat detailed understanding of how the Tesla’s autonomous features are designed to work. Tesla’s “Autopilot” consists of three related systems:
“Traffic Aware Cruise Control,” “Autosteer,” and “Auto Lane Change.”39 Together,
these features allow the car to maintain a desired speed, automatically slow down
and speed up based on traffic conditions, and steer to maintain its position in its
lane.40 The Tesla also had a “Forward Collision Avoidance” system, which includes
a forward collision warning designed to alert the driver to the need to brake, and
automatic emergency braking, which is designed to brake without driver input.

36 Autonomous vehicles have also been involved in a larger number of more minor crashes,
most of which have not resulted in injury. I focus here on fatal crashes both because their
factual record is more developed (thanks in large part to NTSB investigations) and because the
liability issues surrounding fatal crashes are necessarily weightier.
37 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, Highway Accident Report: Collision Between a
Car Operating With Automated Vehicle Control Systems and a Tractor-Semitrailer Truck Near
Williston, Florida, May 7, 2016, at 63 (2017).
38 Id. at 30. The Florida Highway Patrol cited the driver for failure to yield. Id. The truck driver
also tested positive for THC, the active ingredient in marijuana, but the highway patrol noted
that he exhibited no signs of impairment after the crash, and the NTSB noted that testing
positive does not necessarily indicate intoxication. Id. at 31–32.
39 Id. at 9.
40 Id. The auto lane change feature allows the driver to tell the car to change lanes using the
turn indicator, without using the steering wheel or interrupting the autosteer function. Id.
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The Autopilot system is only supposed to be used in certain circumstances.
According to the owner’s manual, “autosteer is intended for use on freeways and
highways where access is limited by entry and exit ramps” (the Federal Highway
Administration refers to such roads as “limited-access roadways”).41 The manual
also warned that Autosteer was only to be used “with a fully attentive driver”
and insisted that “[y]ou must keep your hands on the steering wheel at all
times.”42 The NTSB refers to instructions like these as “soft constraints.”
Autopilot also included “hard constraints,” programmed-in limits that could
not be simply ignored by the driver. First, as a proxy for driver attentiveness,
Tesla required that drivers’ hands be on the steering wheel, which it detected by
measuring torque applied to the wheel. If the car determined that the driver’s
hands were not on the wheel, it would trigger a series of warnings whose
frequency varied depending on a complex set of circumstances including the
straightness of the road.43 First, the car would flash a visual alert. If the driver
did not place his hands on the wheel within 15 seconds, a chime would sound,
followed by a second chime 10 seconds later and finally, five seconds after that,
a “final warning and slowdown.”44
Another important hard constraint related to the car’s determination of the
speed limit of the road on which it was traveling. If the car cannot detect a speed
limit, the adaptive cruise control cannot be set higher than 45 mph. If the car is on
a “non-preferred roadway,” it cannot be set to more than 5 mph above the speed
limit. (One of the roads Brown used in the minutes before his death was “nonpreferred” because it lacked a center divider.) Finally, if the car is on a “preferred
roadway,” it can be set to cruise at speeds up to 90 mph, regardless of the posted
speed limit. The road on which Brown was killed was a preferred roadway
because it had a grassy center median, even though it was not a limited-access
road, meaning that it intersected with surface streets rather than on-ramps and
drivers were sometimes permitted to make left turns across traffic.
Particularly significant is the divergence between the guidance Tesla gave in
its owner’s manual and the hard constraints it programmed into its system.
While Tesla indicated that Autopilot was only to be used on limited-access
highways, its system could be activated even on lesser roads with hazards like
crossing traffic. The problem with this situation is particularly glaring in light of
the NTSB’s further evaluation of the automatic emergency braking and forward

41 Id. at 12–13. The manual also warned drivers that “Traffic Aware Cruise Control is primarily
intended for driving on dry, straight roads, such as highways and freeways.” Id. at 13.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 12.
44 Id. at 12.

168

A. B. Lemann

collision warning systems, which a layperson might reasonably expect to be
able to detect something as conspicuous as a tractor-trailer completely obstructing the road ahead. To the contrary, the NTSB explained, “Current Level 2
vehicle automation technologies cannot reliably identify and respond to crossing vehicle traffic.”45 Indeed, following the crash, the NTSB’s Office of Defects
Investigation determined that no car manufacturer at the time had a system that
was designed to brake for “crossing path collisions” and that the Tesla system
“was not designed to, and did not, identify the truck crossing the car’s path or
recognize the impending crash.”46 It therefore concluded that “there was no
defect in the design of the Tesla crash avoidance and mitigation systems.”47
On the other hand, the NTSB did not shy away from criticizing Tesla. In its
report, the NTSB stressed the importance of the concept of “operational design
domain” in autonomous vehicle development. As Tesla’s user manual indicates,
autonomous vehicles are designed to be able to operate only in certain conditions. Troublingly, while Tesla’s “owner’s manual stated that Autopilot should
only be used in preferred road environments . . . Tesla did not automatically
restrict the availability of Autopilot based on road classification,” as indicated
by the fact that Brown was able to use Autopilot on roads that were not limitedaccess, to tragic effect.48 “Simply stated,” the NTSB concluded, “the driver could
use the Autopilot system on roads for which it was not intended to be used . . . .
This situation allows the driver to activate automated systems in situations and
circumstances for which their use is not appropriate or safe.”49
A related problem is Tesla’s method of ensuring that the driver is paying
attention. Because Autopilot is a Level 2 automation system, it requires the
driver to diligently monitor the road and be prepared to intervene at a moment’s
notice. This is simple but not easy. As the NTSB noted, “human drivers have
cognitive limitations that make fulfilling this responsibility difficult because
people . . . do not perform well on tasks requiring passive vigilance.”50
Requiring that the driver keep his hands on the steering wheel is a poor method
of ensuring that he is paying attention, since what matters is that he is actually
watching the road. Indeed, the internet is full of tips and tricks for how to defeat
45 Id. at 30.
46 Id. The NTSB noted that there was no indication, either on the road or in data from the car’s
electronic control unit, that either the car or the driver saw the truck and attempted to brake
before the crash. Id. at 14–15, 28.
47 Id. at 31. The NTSB does not use the term “defect” in the same way it would be used by a
court evaluating a products liability claim.
48 Id. at 33.
49 Id. at 33–34.
50 Id. at 34.
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Tesla’s system, the simplest of which is to prop a water bottle in the steering
wheel.51 As a result, the internet is also full of videos of people not paying
attention while driving their Teslas.52 The NTSB noted with approval that
Cadillac’s Super Cruise system directly monitors the driver’s head position.53
Of course, Brown’s conduct was not flawless. He was clearly not watching the
road. The NTSB estimated that both he and the truck driver were visible to each
other for about ten seconds before the crash, and yet Brown apparently never saw
the truck he was hurtling towards.54 Data from the car indicated that Brown
repeatedly triggered the Autopilot’s warning by taking his hands off the wheel
in the minutes before the crash, only to silence the alarm by briefly replacing
them. In fact, the vehicle’s data showed that he had his hands on the wheel for
only 25 seconds in the 37 minutes leading up to the crash.55 The NTSB concluded
that Brown “either did not know of or did not heed the guidance in the manual.”56
While the truck driver was widely quoted in the media after the crash as accusing
Brown of watching a movie, the NTSB found no evidence to support his claim.57
The NTSB has not yet completed its full investigation of the second and third
fatalities involving Tesla’s Autopilot, but they raise similar issues. The second crash
killed Walter Huang, a 38 year old Apple employee who had just dropped his
children at school and was on his usual commute to work.58 Huang was traveling
on a limited-access highway with his adaptive cruise control set to 75 mph.59
Because there was traffic in front of him, his car had slowed to 65 mph.60 When
51 Rob Stumpf, People Keep Coming Up With Simple Ways to Fool Tesla’s Autopilot, THE DRIVE,
February 1, 2018, https://www.thedrive.com/sheetmetal/18168/people-keep-coming-up-withways-to-fool-teslas-autopilot (last visited August 14, 2019).
52 Faiz Siddiqui, Tesla floats fully self-driving cars as soon as this year. Many are worried about
what that will unleash., WASHINGTON POST, July 17, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2019/07/17/tesla-floats-fully-self-driving-cars-soon-this-year-many-are-worriedabout-what-that-will-unleash/ (last visited July 17, 2019) (“The Internet is filled with videos of
Tesla drivers acting recklessly, in extreme cases taking naps or otherwise driving with their
hands off the wheel as they marvel at the system.”).
53 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, supra note 37, at 34.
54 Id. at 29.
55 Id. at 35.
56 Id. at 36.
57 Id. at 17, 36.
58 Edvard Pettersson & Diana Hull, Tesla Sued Over Fatal Crash Blamed on Autopilot
Malfunction, BLOOMBERG, May 1, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-01/
tesla-sued-over-fatal-crash-blamed-on-autopilot-navigation-error (last visited June 25, 2019).
59 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, Preliminary Report: Highway HWY18FH011
(2018), https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/HWY18FH011-prelimi
nary.pdf (last visited June 24, 2019).
60 Id. at 2.
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the car in front moved out of the way, Huang’s Tesla accelerated and then veered
into a barrier between the main highway and an exit ramp.61 Like Brown, Huang
apparently was not watching the road in the minutes before the crash.62 The NTSB’s
investigation is still ongoing; so far there is no indication of why the Tesla veered
out of its lane and into the barrier.63
The final crash involving Autopilot occurred in March 2019 and killed
Jeremy Banner in circumstances eerily similar to the Brown crash three years
earlier. Banner was driving with autopilot engaged on a divided (but not limitedaccess) highway in Florida when his Tesla collided with a tractor-trailer that was
turning left across his path.64 The Tesla was travelling at 68 mph (the speed limit
was 55 mph), and neither Banner nor the Autopilot system reacted to the truck in
any way.65 Banner was killed instantly.
b Uber
The fourth and – as of this writing – last fatality involving an autonomous
vehicle occurred when an Uber that was undergoing testing of its autonomous
61 Id. The barrier was a “crash attenuator,” a device designed to absorb energy from a collision
by crumpling into itself. Unfortunately, it was damaged from a crash that occurred 10 days
earlier and thus incapable of absorbing the impact from Huang’s car. Id. at 3.
62 Id. at 2.; Tesla, An Update on Last Week’s Accident (2018), https://www.tesla.com/blog/
update-last-week%E2%80%99s-accident (last visited June 25, 2019) (noting that “[t]he driver
had about five seconds and 150 meters of unobstructed view of the concrete divider with the
crushed crash attenuator, but the vehicle logs show that no action was taken”).
63 Huang’s family has filed suit against Tesla. Complaint, Huang v. Tesla, Inc., No. 19CV346663
(Cal. Sup. Ct. April 26, 2019). There have been several other, nonfatal crashes in which Teslas
operating in Autopilot have unexpectedly veered off the road. See, e. g. Chris Isidore & Gwen
Sung, Driver in Tesla Autopilot accident would buy another Tesla, CNN BUSINESS, July 12, 2016,
https://money.cnn.com/2016/07/12/technology/tesla-autopilot-accident/index.html?sr=
twCNN071216tesla-autopilot-accident0540PMVODtopLink&linkId=26486092 (last visited June
27, 2019) (describing accident in which car “veered to the right and hit a series of wooden
stakes on the side of the road”); Mike Spector, Jack Nicas & Mike Ramsey, Tesla’s Autopilot
Vexes Some Drivers, Even Its Fans, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/
teslas-autopilot-vexes-some-drivers-even-its-fans-1467827084 (last visited June 27, 2019)
(describing several crashes in which Teslas collided with immobile objects). It is perhaps
notable that there are numerous videos on YouTube showing Tesla’s autopilot engaging in
similar behavior, with drivers intervening at the last moment to correct the computer’s disastrous course. See., e. g. Stan Lettink, Tesla Autopilot Fails and Crashes (2019), https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=cPMvQphJQiE (last visited June 25, 2019).
64 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, Preliminary Report: Highway HWY19FH008 1–2
(2019), https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/HWY19FH008-prelimi
nary-report.aspx (last visited June 24, 2019).
65 Id. at 2.
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system crashed into a pedestrian named Elaine Herzberg in Tempe, Arizona.66
Although this collision too is still under investigation, it is already clear that
there are many parties whose omissions helped cause the accident. Herzberg, for
instance, was jaywalking at night across an unlit portion of a four-lane road
whose speed limit was 45 mph.67 She was wearing dark clothing and pushing a
bicycle that lacked side reflectors, and she did not react at all as the car
approached her.68 Toxicology tests were positive for methamphetamine and
marijuana.69
Meanwhile, the autonomous Uber’s testing was being overseen by a human
safety driver, whose job was to supervise the vehicle’s driving and “intervene if
the system fails to perform appropriately during testing.”70 The operator was
also responsible for monitoring a display in the middle of the car’s dashboard.71
This display showed diagnostic messages and also allowed the operator to tag
“events of interest” for follow-up by engineers.72 The operator was being
recorded by inward-facing cameras and can be seen looking down at a screen
until the final moment before the crash.73 She told investigators that she had
been monitoring the car’s display,74 but data obtained by the Tempe Police
Department from the operator’s Hulu account strongly suggests that she was
watching an episode of The Voice at the time of the crash.75
While both of the humans involved failed to notice the impending collision,
the autonomous system that was driving the car did at least detect Herzberg
crossing the street. The system registered radar and LIDAR observations of
Herzberg about six seconds before the crash, while the car was traveling at
43 mph. What happened next is hard to understand. As the car sped towards
66 Fredrick Kunkle, Fatal crash with self-driving car was a first – like Bridget Driscoll’s was
121 years ago with one of the first cars, WASHINGTON POST, March 22, 2018, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/tripping/wp/2018/03/22/fatal-crash-with-self-driving-car-was-a-firstlike-bridget-driscolls-was-121-years-ago-with-one-of-the-first-cars/ (last visited June 25, 2019);
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, Preliminary Report: Highway HWY18MH010 (2018).
67 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, supra, at 1.
68 Id. at 3.
69 Id. at 4.
70 Id. at 2.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 3. (noting that the vehicle operator intervened by engaging the steering wheel “less
than a second” before the crash and did not brake until after impact).
74 Id.
75 Kate Conger & Bryan Menegus, Uber Driver in Fatal Tempe Crash May Have Been Watching
The Voice Behind the Wheel, GIZMODO, June 22, 2018, https://gizmodo.com/uber-driver-in-fataltempe-crash-may-have-been-watching-1827039127 (last visited June 26, 2019).
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Herzberg, the autonomous system struggled to decide what, exactly, it was
seeing. First it classified her as an unknown object, then as a vehicle, and finally
as a bicycle.76 Each of these classifications triggered different expectations of
Herzberg’s future path.77 Regardless of what it thought Herzberg was, the system
did not see the need to slow down or change lanes, as a human driver naturally
would. Only after about five seconds of dithering did the system finally determine that an “emergency braking maneuver” was called for.78 Unfortunately,
emergency braking maneuvers had been disabled during testing “to reduce the
potential for erratic vehicle behavior.”79 The system was also not capable of
alerting the operator of the need to brake.80

4 Are autonomous vehicles safer?
Much of the scholarly and popular writing about autonomous vehicles and the
liability issues they raise predicts that they will be substantially safer than
conventional, human-driven cars. While autonomous vehicles show enormous
promise, they have yet to prove that they are substantially safer than human
drivers, and may not be able to do so for many decades.81 Cars being operated
by autonomous systems have killed four people in the United States, a number
that pales in comparison to the roughly 40,000 killed in car crashes every year,
but of course what matters is the fatality rate per mile traveled, and on that basis
the superior safety of autonomous vehicles remains theoretical. Meanwhile,
more prosaic low-level automation features that are already available today
may achieve many of the safety gains promised by highly autonomous vehicles.
Roughly 94% of roadway fatalities are currently attributable to one or
another form of human error. Twenty-nine percent of fatalities involved alcohol
impairment, 26% involved speeding, 8.5% involved distracted driving, and 2.1%
involved drowsy drivers.82 Whatever else can be said of autonomous vehicles,

76 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, supra note 66, at 2.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 NIDHI KALRA & SUSAN M. PADDOCK, Driving to Safety: How Many Miles of Driving Would It
Take To Demonstrate Autonomous Vehicle Reliability (2016), https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RR1478.html (last visited June 26, 2019).
82 NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, Traffic Safety Facts: Research Note 4,
5 (2018), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812603 (last visited June
26, 2019). These figures are not necessarily cumulative.
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they presumably will never get drunk, text their friends, or fall asleep at the
wheel. They also have powers of perception, attention, and reaction that far
surpass even the most skilled human driver.83 This enormous promise has led
many to envision a world virtually free of car accidents,84 in which crumple
zones and seatbelts will be a thing of the past.
Nevertheless, as the crashes surveyed above suggest, “[t]he common suggestion that ‘driverless cars’ are ‘already safer’ than conventional vehicles
remains premature.”85 While Tesla has defended itself against media scrutiny
in the wake of fatal crashes by insisting that from the perspective of fatalities per
mile travelled, Autopilot is more than three times safer than a human driver,86 it
has not released data sufficient to support that claim.87 Tesla’s cars are significantly heavier, newer, and more expensive than the typical American car,
making any comparison of Autopilot crash statistics with countrywide figures
inherently fraught.88 Autopilot is also designed to be operated only on limitedaccess highways, which even for human drivers are by far the safest type of road
on a per-vehicle-mile-traveled basis.89
None of the other companies working on fully autonomous, Level 4 and 5
vehicles have yet caused a fatality, making it hard to evaluate their safety
relative to traditional cars. This problem is compounded by the fact that companies like Waymo have only very recently (and very gingerly) begun removing
83 KALRA AND PADDOCK, supra note 81, at 1.
84 GENERAL MOTORS, 2018 Self-Driving Safety Report 3, https://www.gm.com/content/dam/
company/docs/us/en/gmcom/gmsafetyreport.pdf (last visited June 27, 2019) (“At General
Motors, we envision a future with zero crashes, zero emissions, and zero congestion.”).
85 Smith, supra note 13, at 17.
86 Tesla, supra note 62.
87 Tom Simonite, Tesla’s Dubious Claims About Autopilot’s Safety Record, MIT TECH. REV., Jul.
6, 2016, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601849/teslas-dubious-claims-about-autopilotssafety-record/ (last visited June 27, 2019) (quoting experts referring to Tesla’s claims as “ludicrous” and having “no meaning”).
88 Nick Lum & Edward Niedermeyer, How Tesla and Elon Musk Exaggerated Safety Claims
About Autopilot and Cars, THE DAILY BEAST, July 14, 2016, https://www.thedailybeast.com/howtesla-and-elon-musk-exaggeraged-safety-claims-about-autopilot-and-cars (last visited June 27,
2019); see also Sam Abuelsamid, Adding Some Statistical Perspective To Tesla Autopilot Safety
Claims, FORBES, 2016, https://www.forbes.com/sites/samabuelsamid/2016/07/05/adding-somestatistical-perspective-to-tesla-autopilot-safety-claims/ (last visited June 27, 2019); Matt Drange,
Studies Don’t Support Elon Musk’s Autopilot Safety Claims, THE INFORMATION, 2019, https://
www.theinformation.com/articles/studies-dont-support-elon-musks-autopilot-safety-claims
(last visited June 27, 2019).
89 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 2015 Status of the Nation’s Highways, Bridges, and
Transit: Conditions & Performance 4–8 (2016), https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/2015cpr/pdfs/
2015cpr.pdf (last visited June 28, 2019).
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human safety operators from the driver’s seat of their autonomous vehicles. In
some states (most notably California), companies testing autonomous vehicles
are required to file periodic reports that list statistics like the number of miles
driven and “disengagements,” or instances in which human operators intervene
to correct the autonomous system’s driving. These figures are notoriously resistant to meaningful analysis. While the number of disengagements per mile is
widely treated as a yardstick for companies’ relative progress in developing a
viable fully autonomous vehicle,90 it can also be highly sensitive to the environment in which the vehicle is being tested: The busy streets of downtown San
Francisco pose a far greater challenge to an autonomous vehicle than the
predictable, well-groomed suburbs of Phoenix.
Even on the more concrete metric of injuries per mile, there are limits to the
autonomous vehicles’ ability to demonstrate their own safety. Waymo, the
industry leader in terms of miles traveled,91 had driven around 1.3 million
miles on public roads as of 2015.92 In that time it was involved in 11 crashes,
only two of which caused injury.93 Conventional vehicles, by contrast, cause 77
injuries and 1.09 fatalities per 100 million miles driven.94 But humans drive
about 3 trillion miles in the U.S. every single year. Compared with that number,
even Waymo’s experience is just a blip – far too small for statistical comparison.95 Indeed, a RAND report concluded that autonomous vehicles would have
to drive hundreds of millions or even billions of miles before their safety could
be meaningfully compared with that of conventional vehicles.96
Meanwhile, as the hope of a widely available highly autonomous vehicle
appearing in the near term has faded, automakers have gotten better and better
at developing more incremental technology that offers much of the safety benefit
of full autonomy with less convenience and world-changing frisson. One study
estimated that blind-spot monitoring, lane departure warning, and forward
90 Mark Gurman, Apple’s Autonomous Cars Need Much More Human Help Than Its Rivals,
BLOOMBERG.COM, February 13, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-13/
apple-s-autonomous-cars-need-much-more-human-help-than-rivals (last visited August 7,
2019) (interpreting Apple’s higher disengagement rate as “an indication the iPhone maker
may lag well behind” competitors like Waymo and Cruise).
91 Alan Ohnsman, Waymo Is Millions Of Miles Ahead In Robot Car Tests; Does It Need A Billion
More?, FORBES, Mar. 2, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/alanohnsman/2018/03/02/waymo-ismillions-of-miles-ahead-in-robot-car-tests-does-it-need-a-billion-more/ (last visited July 2, 2019).
92 WAYMO, Waymo Safety Report: On the Road to Fully Sefl-Driving 7, https://storage.googlea
pis.com/sdc-prod/v1/safety-report/Safety%20Report%202018.pdf (last visited June 27, 2019).
93 KALRA AND PADDOCK, supra note 81, at 2.
94 Id. at 2.
95 Id. at 1–2.
96 Id. at 1.
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collision warning could prevent 10,100 fatal crashes every year if they were
universally adopted.97 Automatic emergency braking could reduce rear-end
crashes (which killed 2,300 people in 2016)98 by 80%, according to the
NTSB.99 It is worth mentioning that around 10,000 people who were not wearing
seat belts are killed in car crashes every year.100 The technology to ensure seat
belt use has existed for decades.101

B Scholarly literature on autonomous vehicle liability
Despite being a technology in its infancy that has so far killed only four people,
autonomous vehicles have already generated an enormous body of scholarly
literature. Law reviews have published dozens of articles exploring the implications of autonomous vehicles for various areas of law,102 but the problems they
pose for tort law in particular have attracted the most sustained and serious
attention.103 If there exists a spectrum of liability, from “absolute” liability on
97 Smith, supra note 13, at 16–17.
98 Insurance Information Institute, Facts + Statistics: Highway safety, https://www.iii.org/factstatistic/facts-statistics-highway-safety (last visited July 2, 2019).
99 Mims, supra note 22.
100 NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 82, at 5.
101 See Andrzej Rapaczynski, Driverless Cars and the Much Delayed Tort Law Revolution,
Colum. L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 540, at 22 (2016) (unpublished manuscript), available
at: https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2764686 (last visited June 18, 2019).
102 See, e. g., Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, Remedies for Robots, ___ U. CHI. L. REV. ____
(forthcoming 2019), available at: https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3223621 (last visited June 19,
2019) (exploring implications for remedies law); Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of
Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 53 (2015) (cyberlaw); Robert Peterson, New Technology – Old
Law: Autonomous Vehicles and California’s Insurance Framework, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1341 (2012) (insurance law).
103 See F. Patrick Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots”: Balancing Liability, Regulation, and
Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 71 (2014); David C Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability
Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 34 (2014); Rapaczynski, supra note 101; Ryan
Benjamin Abbott, The Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the Paradigm of Tort Liability, 86 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1 (2016); Mark A Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous Vehicles: State Tort
Liability, Automobile Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 85 (2017);
Bryan H. Choi, Crashworthy Code, 94 WASH. L. REV. 39 (2019); Kenneth S. Abraham & Robert L.
Rabin, Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer Responsibility for Accidents: A New Legal Regime
for a New Era, 105 VA. L. REV. 127 (2019); Kyle D. Logue, The Deterrence Case for Comprehensive
Automaker Enterprise Liability, 2019 J. L. & MOB. 1 (2019); Steven Shavell, On the Redesign of
Accident Liability for the World of Autonomous Vehicles, NBER Working Paper No. 26220 (2019)
(unpublished manuscript), available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3437474 (last visited August 23, 2019).

176

A. B. Lemann

one end to immunity on the other, legal scholars have recommended that
autonomous vehicles be placed at virtually every position on that spectrum.
While this scholarship differs as widely as possible on this important prescriptive question, it often shares a set of factual and normative assumptions
that drive its analyses. First, as discussed above, scholars widely assume that
autonomous vehicles will be far safer than conventional vehicles. Second,
scholars widely assume that the first assumption is of central importance in
addressing the issue of autonomous vehicle liability. In other words, the relative
safety of autonomous vehicles as compared with conventional vehicles is treated
as a fact that is critically important in any analysis of how the tort system should
treat autonomous vehicles. I argue that this is not the case, or at least that its
truth depends on certain important prior normative commitments that are often
unstated. The question of how relevant the safety of one technology is to the
design of another is one that tort law has grappled with for decades, with mixed
and difficult to explain results.
Among scholars who have addressed the issue of autonomous vehicle
liability, the majority take the position that the application of current tort
doctrine to accidents involving autonomous vehicles is problematic for some
reason. Relatively few, in other words, argue that tort law is capable of handling
disputes over autonomous vehicle crashes.104 The majority position, by contrast,
is that applying existing tort principles to autonomous vehicle crashes will be
undesirable for several reasons.
First, many scholars, adopting a broadly “realist” utilitarian perspective,
express concern that tort liability will slow the adoption of autonomous vehicles.
Because autonomous vehicles are taken to be a technology that will transform
life in a whole host of ways, including by making car crashes a thing of the past,
104 Hubbard, supra note 103, at 1803 (arguing that “the legal system’s method of addressing
physical injury from robotic machines that interact closely with humans provides an appropriate balance of innovation and liability for personal injury”); Smith, supra note 13, at 2–3
(arguing that “the current product liability regime . . . is probably compatible with the adoption
of automated driving systems”); Andrew P. Garza, Note, Look Ma, No Hands: Wrinkles and
Wrecks in the Age of Autonomous Vehicles, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 581–616, 581 (2012) (“Products
liability law is capable of handling the advent of autonomous vehicles just as it handled seat
belts, airbags, and cruise control.”); Bryan Casey, Robot Ipsa Loquitur, ___ GEO. L.J. ____
(forthcoming 2019), available at: https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3327673 (last visited June 17,
2019) (arguing that “the purportedly novel challenges posed by robots are neither unprecedented, unresolvable, nor even unique to emerging technologies”). See also Vladeck, supra note
103, at 58, 67 (arguing that “the introduction of truly autonomous vehicles is unlikely to present
legal issues that tax our current product liability regime” but also that “the law is not
necessarily equipped to address the legal issues that will start to arise when . . . there is no
‘principal’ directing the actions of the machine”).
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hastening their adoption is thought to be a matter of grave concern. In a way,
focusing on fatalities minimizes the overall impact of car crashes in the United
States, since the vast majority of crashes do not kill anyone.105 The NHTSA has
calculated a total annual economic impact of about $836 billion.106 Autonomous
vehicles are also commonly thought to offer decreased congestion, increased
fuel economy, increased productivity, and increased mobility, all of which could
lead to substantial economic gains beyond the enormous savings in accident
avoidance. While estimates of the total cost of autonomous vehicle development
are hard to come by, they appear to be a technology that is clearly, overwhelmingly “efficient,” in the sense of satisfying the Hand formula.
Against this backdrop, imposing any liability on manufacturers of autonomous vehicles begins to look like a problem. Many commentators, surveying the
legal landscape, predict that while autonomous vehicles may decrease the overall “pie” of accident costs, the companies that make them will be responsible for
a far larger “slice” of that pie, because they will have taken over from the rest of
us responsibility for the driving task.107 If that bigger slice of a smaller pie is
larger than car manufacturers’ current responsibility for the costs of accidents,
then saddling them with liability threatens to deter them from developing this
life-saving, world-changing technology.108
105 Smith, supra note 13, at 22 (noting roughly 19 million crashes involving property damage
only).
106 Id. at 21. Roughly one third of that figure represents direct economic costs; the other two
thirds is comprised of estimates of the monetary value of loss of life and diminished quality of
life. Id. The $836 billion figure is based on a “value of a statistical life” of $9 million. Using
other popular figures causes the total cost to range from about $500 billion to over $1 trillion.
Id.
107 Id. at 2, 20.
108 Calo, supra note 102, at 575 (“[T]he potential for crippling legal liability . . . may lead
entrepreneurs and investors to abandon open robots in favor of robots with more limited
functionality.”); Rapaczynski, supra note 101, at 25 (noting that “the question concerning the
ability of the present torts system to handle the introduction of self-driving cars without unduly
delaying it or making it prohibitively costly seems to be generating some anxiety among the
experts and the industry”); Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming Collision between
Autonomous Vehicles and the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1321–1340, 1322 (2012)
(arguing that “liability has the potential to present a significant deterrent to the development of
autonomous vehicles, even though such vehicles would provide an overall safety benefit”).
Mark Geistfeld dismisses concerns that lawsuits will “kill the autonomous car” as “sensationalizing,” but nevertheless expresses concern that “substantial uncertainty about the potential
scope of manufacturer liabilities could . . . impede the widespread deployment of autonomous
vehicles.” Geistfeld, supra note 103, at 1617.
There is reason to be skeptical of the argument that tort liability threatens to deter the
development of autonomous vehicles to any meaningful extent. While manufacturers are
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Another set of arguments starts from a more conceptualist or interpretivist
premise and posits that there is something uniquely new about autonomous
vehicles that makes attempting to apply existing tort doctrine to them incoherent. Much of this scholarship draws on technical aspects of artificial intelligence
and the various ways in which it will prove hard for the legal system to understand. The key feature here is the concept of “emergent behavior,” in which an
algorithm is programmed to pursue certain goals while following a set of rules
and can then teach itself how to behave by doing some activity over and over.109
Unlike in a more traditional programming context, explaining why the software
did something (like veer off the road) is difficult, because it isn’t programmed as
a series of “if, then” instructions.110 Instead, the algorithm makes decisions of its
own for reasons that are inscrutable.111 Many experts have thus concluded that
identifying a discrete defect in the algorithm will prove impossible, because
there will not be a single line of code or design feature to which responsibility
for a crash can be attributed.112 The concept of a reasonable alternative design is
widely thought to be an awkward fit here as well, since the only way an
algorithm can be taught to behave differently in a given situation is with more

frequently quoted in the popular press expressing concern, it is hard to know what effect the
fear of liability is having on their behavior, if any. Companies like Google, Uber, Tesla, Apple,
and General Motors have for years been investing many billions of dollars in autonomous
vehicle development. It seems hard to credit the idea that their investments would be greater if
the threat of liability were removed. In California alone, there are currently 61 companies
licensed to test autonomous vehicles on public roads. State of California Department of Motor
Vehicles, Permit Holders (Testing with a Driver) (2019), https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/
detail/vr/autonomous/permit (last visited June 28, 2019).
109 Calo, supra note 102, at 56; Surden and Williams, supra note 3, at 147–48.
110 Geistfeld, supra note 103, at 1644–45 (explaining how machine learning differs from
“if-then” commands).
111 Hubbard, supra note 103, at 120–21 (arguing that emergent behavior “raise[s] virtually
insurmountable proof problems concerning such issues as defectiveness and causation”).
Sophia H Duffy & Jamie Patrick Hopkins, Sit, Stay, Drive: The Future of Autonomous Car
Liability 16 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 453, 479 (2013) (arguing that “[e]xisting laws governing
vehicles and computers do not provie the proper means to assess liability for autonomous
cars”).
112 Abraham and Rabin, supra note 103, at 144 (arguing that “esoteric, algorithm-based design
differences . . . would impose overwhelming stress on the premises of conventional analysis.”);
Nora Freeman Engstrom, When Cars Crash: The Automobile’s Tort Law Legacy, 53 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 293, 297 (2018) (“Our traditional negligence system, designed for the Model T and
premised on personal responsibility, will fit this new world awkardly, indicating that fundamental change ought to come.”); Choi, supra note 103, at 44 (“A fundamental attribute of
software–computational complexity–confounds the usual tort calculus refined for ordinary
manufactured goods.”).
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training, and it is impossible to know how much more would be required to
avoid any particular crash.113 This is in sharp contrast to the designer of a
physical product like a lathe, whose decision to select a particular type of set
screw to hold a piece of wood in place can easily be reevaluated ex post.114
These lines of reasoning lead to the conclusion that tort law must be
changed in some way to accommodate the advent of the driverless car. Many
scholars have proposed entirely new liability regimes for driverless cars that
represent dramatic departures from traditional tort principles. Mark Geistfeld, for
example, has argued that autonomous vehicles should be considered per se
non-defective in any particular crash so long as they can be demonstrated to be
at least twice as safe as conventional vehicles in the aggregate (and as long as
the manufacturer warns consumers about the level of risk that remains).115
Kenneth Abraham and Robert Rabin, expressing fear that Geistfeld’s twice-assafe hurdle will be far too easy to clear,116 have proposed a system called
“manufacturer enterprise responsibility,” in which bodily injury would be compensated from a fund created by assessments on manufacturers.117 Steven
Shavell has proposed a new system of strict liability in which damages would
be paid to the state rather than to victims.118 Other scholars have put forward a
range of creative solutions to the problem of autonomous vehicle liability, from
no-fault insurance schemes119 to doctrinal tweaks like treating autonomous
113 Abraham and Rabin, supra note 103, at 144 (“As largely uniform software becomes pervasive, the concept of a reasonable alternative design . . . is likely to become increasingly
indeterminate.”); Choi, supra note 103, at 64 (“[T]he challenge of software liability is that it is
seemingly impossible to identify marginal-cost measures that can or should be taken to improve
software safety.”).
114 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. 377 P.2d 897, 899 (Cal. 1963).
115 Geistfeld, supra note 103, at 1651 (“Taking into account the risk-utility trade-off between a
conventional vehicle and an imperfect but safer autonomous vehicle, the fully functioning
autonomous vehicle will necessarily drive in a reasonably safe manner if prior driving experience shows that the operating system at least halves the incidence of crashes relative to
conventional vehicles.”). Geistfeld sees continued relevance for the application of traditional
tort principles in cases, crashes caused by a malfunction of the operating system due to
programming error, or hacking by a third party. Id. at 1634, 1663. In a similar vein, Ryan
Abbott suggests that autonomous vehicle manufacturers be subject to negligence rather than
strict liability as long as their driving is safer than that of a reasonable person. Abbott, supra
note 103, at 27.
116 Abraham and Rabin, supra note 103, at 145.
117 Id. at 147. Kyle Logue has proposed a comprehensive automaker enterprise liability system
in which manufacturers of vehicles of any kind would be “unconditionally responsible for the
economic losses resulting from any crashes of their vehicles.” Logue, supra note 103, at 5.
118 Shavell, supra note 103.
119 Vladeck, supra note 103, at 147–49.
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driving as an “ultrahazardous activity”120 or holding that autonomous vehicles
are functionally equivalent to animals and thus subject to the same set of strict
liability rules.121
There are reasons to be skeptical of all of these arguments. Autonomous
vehicles arguably pose no greater challenge to the application of traditional tort
principles than many other once cutting-edge technologies. Applying those
principles leads to insights both about how autonomous vehicle liability should
work and about how we should understand the tort system more generally.

II What tort law says about driverless cars, and
vice versa
Much of the scholarly literature on autonomous vehicle liability relies explicitly
on the premise that autonomous vehicles will be far safer than conventional
ones. Indeed, this premise drives much of the utilitarian concern that autonomous vehicle development will be deterred by excessive liability. My quarrel is
not with the validity of this premise but rather with its relevance. In determining
whether and when autonomous vehicle manufacturers should be liable for car
crashes, their overall statistical safety relative to human drivers should be
irrelevant, at least from the perspective of tort law.122 There are several conceptually overlapping tort doctrines that compel this result. They also lead to
theoretical insights about how tort law does and does not promote the efficient
allocation of resources, and the moral principles that lie at its core.

A Doctrine
Many commentators have based arguments for some sort of modification to tort
doctrine for driverless cars on the idea that driverless cars will be much safer than
conventional ones. Thus, it is widely thought, it is appropriate to shield them from
the intense scrutiny of strict products liability. Notably absent from the discussion,

120 See Hubbard, supra note 103, at 131–32 (collecting cites).
121 Duffy & Hopkins, supra note 111, at 453.
122 It is worth emphasizing that my argument has no bearing on whether conventional vehicles
should be disfavored as a regulatory matter, or even as a personal matter.
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however, is the issue of liability for manufacturers of conventional vehicles. In a
world with flawless robot drivers, does a human-driven car become defective? If
the defectiveness of autonomous vehicles ought to be evaluated by comparing
them with conventional vehicles, the opposite would seem to be equally true.
Scholars do not, however, argue that a conventional vehicle should be considered
defective in relying on a human driver.123
The reason is that such a case would appear to be an obvious non-starter.
There are a host of doctrinal obstacles that stand in the way of an argument that
an outmoded, less-safe technology is therefore defective. These include the various ways of defining design defects (including what constitutes a reasonable
alternative design), the widespread rejection of “category liability,” and the
admissibility of evidence of custom. At various points in the history of motor
vehicle safety, plaintiffs have argued that their cars were defective because they
lacked the latest safety features. Thanks to these doctrines, they have mostly been
unsuccessful. All of this evidence suggests that when evaluating the defectiveness
of a particular product, tort law is hesitant to expand the scope of its analysis to
include other products that accomplish similar ends.

1 Defect
It has been a commonplace observation for many decades that strict products
liability is not truly “strict” in the sense of relieving the plaintiff of the burden of
showing fault.124 Instead of requiring that the plaintiff prove that the defendant
failed to exercise reasonable care, products liability requires that the plaintiff show
that the product contained a defect (either in manufacturing, design, or warning)
that caused injury. Manufacturing defects, which focus on a flaw in the individual
product sold to the plaintiff that deviates from the manufacturer’s own specifications, have always been relatively straightforward conceptually. Indeed, the first

123 Ryan Abbott argues that autonomous vehicles should be subject to negligence rather than
strict liability as long as they are “safer than a reasonable person.” He then argues that once
autonomous drivers pass this threshold, the “reasonable person” standard for negligent human
drivers should be jettisoned in favor of a “reasonable computer” standard, since “we are all
‘hasty and awkward’ compared to the reasonable computer.” Abbott, supra note 103, at 1.
Abbott does not, however, argue that manufacturers of conventional vehicles should be liable
to their customers in products liability when their customers’ human errors cause crashes.
124 David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the “Strict” Products Liability Myth, 1996
U. ILL. L. REV. 743 (1996).
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cases holding manufacturers liable for injuries caused by their products regardless
of privity of contract involved manufacturing defects.125
Design defects, in which the plaintiff identifies some purported flaw with an
entire line of products, are the hardest to define with precision, since virtually
all products are capable of causing injury even when used reasonably.126 In no
context is this more true than with the automobile. Giving people the power to
transport themselves at great speed on all types of roads at all times of day in all
weather conditions and burdened by the distractions of everyday life is an
inherently dangerous enterprise. Moreover, cars have been designed and produced in almost unimaginable variety, with details large and small127 contributing in significant ways to vehicle safety.
Although cars attracted ire as bringers of death and destruction almost since
their first invention, manufacturers argued for decades that they had no obligation to design cars in such a way as to minimize injury in the event of a collision.
Courts routinely accepted this argument, holding that a manufacturer had no
duty “to make his car accident-proof or fool-proof.”128 This reasoning was finally
rejected in 1968 in the landmark case of Larsen v. General Motors, in which the
plaintiff argued that his Chevy Corvair was defective in design after a relatively
low-speed front end collision caused the steering column to be thrust backwards
into his head like a “spear aimed at a vital part of the driver’s anatomy.”129
Larsen held that a car manufacturer is “under a duty to use reasonable care in
125 James A. Henderson Jr & Aaron Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier:
The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1269–70 (1991).
126 David G. Owen, Design Defects, 73 MO. L. REV. 291, 291 (2008) (calling the “true meaning”
of design defect “[e]lusive as an elf” and noting that it “has largely escaped capture by court or
commentator, and the search therefor leads inexorably to consternation and confusion”).
127 See, e. g., Mickle v. Blackmon, 166 S.E.2d 173, 187–88 (S.C. 1969) (plaintiff impaled on gear
shift whose protective plastic knob had gradually deteriorated when exposed to sunlight
because manufacturer used white rather than black plastic).
128 Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 824 (1966). Evans involved a car with an
“x-frame” that lacked side rails and thus offered significantly less protection to occupants in
a side-impact collision than a car with a “perimeter frame.” Id. at 823. The court held that
the car was not “unfit for its intended use” because “[t]he intended purpose of an automobile does not include its participation in collisions with other objects.” Id. at 825. The court
admitted that it might perhaps “be desirable to require manufacturers to construct automobiles in which it would be safe to collide,” but insisted that “that would be a legislative
function, not an aspect of judicial interpretation of existing law.” Id. at 824.
129 Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 497 n.2 (1968). The Corvair attracted the
particular ire of Ralph Nader, who called attention to its lack of a steering shaft that would
collapse in the event of a front-end impact, in addition to numerous other problems with the
car’s design. RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF THE
AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE (1965).
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the design of its vehicle to avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of
injury in the event of a collision,” which after all, “with or without fault of the
user are clearly foreseeable by the manufacturer and are statistically inevitable.”130 Larsen, probably not coincidentally, was decided against a national
backdrop of concern over the mounting toll of car crashes and anger at car
manufacturers’ failure to emphasize safety in their designs that culminated in
the passage of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, which
established the NHTSA and tasked it with regulating the design of motor
vehicles.131
Larsen and its progeny definitively rejected the argument that manufacturers had no duty to take crashworthiness into account in designing a car. It
did not, however, hold that manufacturers would be strictly liable for crashes.132
Determining just what makes the design of a car defective has proven tricky. The
consumer expectations and risk/utility tests emerged as two formulations, initially competing alternatives133 and then confined to (somewhat) distinct
realms,134 before the Third Restatement endorsed the risk/utility test to the
exclusion of the consumer expectations test.
Both tests would initially appear to rely on a kind of cross-product comparison that arguably supports the idea that autonomous vehicle safety should be
evaluated by reference to conventional vehicle safety. The consumer expectations test, after all, asks whether the product “failed to perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably
foreseeable manner,”135 and the reasonable consumer’s expectations are presumably shaped to a significant degree by his or her exposure to similar
products. For example, consumers do not expect that cars will suddenly lose
power on the highway or suddenly accelerate from a dead stop without driver
input, because cars do not typically do these things. These are easy cases.136

130 Larsen, 391 F.2d at 502.
131 See generally NADER, supra note 129; JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE
FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990).
132 Larsen, 391 F.2d at 506.
133 Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
134 See Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 311 (Cal. 1994) (holding that use of
consumer expectations test is inappropriate in cases involving “technical and mechanical
detail” in which “ordinary experience and understanding” are unlikely to create any reasonable
expectation in the mind of an ordinary consumer).
135 Barker, 573 P.2d at 443.
136 See James A. Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design Choices: The
Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1571–72 (1973).
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And yet the extent to which consumers can look outside the product at issue
to establish their expectations is limited. In Dyson v. General Motors, for example, the plaintiff was driving a two-door “hardtop” convertible that rolled onto
its roof during a crash.137 Because the car lacked the rigid center posts and door
frames of a typical sedan, the roof was not able to support its weight, and it
collapsed.138 The court followed Larsen and rejected the argument that the
manufacturer had no duty at all, holding that “it is the obligation of an
automobile manufacturer to provide more than merely a movable platform
capable of transporting passengers from one point to another. The passengers
must be provided a reasonably safe container within which to make the journey.”139 On the question of whether the car at issue was reasonably safe,
however, the court expressed doubt. It noted that “[t]he manufacturer cannot
be expected to provide a convertible which is as safe in roll-over accidents as a
standard four-door sedan.”140 Rather, it was only obligated to make “a reasonably safe version of such model” that was not “substantially less safe than other
hardtop models.”141 The problem is one of scope: in evaluating the defectiveness
of a design for purposes of strict products liability, the court noted, it would be
wrong to compare the rollover safety of convertibles with standard sedans; it
simply didn’t matter that the sedan was the inherently safer design.142

2 Category liability and reasonable alternative design
Dyson introduces nicely the problem of “category liability”: cases in which the
plaintiff’s success in proving that a product is defective would amount to a

137 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969); see also Note, Automobile Design Liability: Larsen v.
General Motors and Its Aftermath, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 299 (1969) (discussing Dyson).
138 Id. at 1073.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 See Holiday Motor Co. v. Walters,790 S.E.2d 447, 456 (Va. 2016) (“If a person purchases a
convertible, he cannot expect – and the Court may not impose on the manufacturer a duty to
provide him with – the exact kind of protection in a rollover accident as in the standard
American passenger car.” (quotations omitted)); Delvaux v. Ford Motor Co., 764 F.2d 469, 474
(7th Cir. 1985) (“Since the most obvious feature of a convertible is its lack of a roof, dangers
which the ordinary consumer would associate with that feature will not support a strict product
liability cause of action in Wisconsin.”); Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 808, 811 (10th
Cir. 1981) (“Plaintiff Curtis made a deliberate choice to purchase a vehicle which, as a reasonable consumer, he should have expected was not as safe as others on the market.”).
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determination that an entire category of products is defective. In other words,
there appeared to be no way in Dyson to manufacture a hardtop convertible
whose roof would not have collapsed under the weight of the overturned car.143
Category liability has always been controversial.144 Apart from a few scattered
exceptions, it has never been the law in any state.145 Henderson and Twerski,
the reporters of the Third Restatement of Products Liability, attacked it with
particular force, and argued that the consumer expectations test suffered from
the “fatal flaw” of exposing the manufacturer to “the real possibility of liability
without defect.”146 Henderson and Twerski thus argued that the consumer
expectations test was so subjective as to be “almost entirely rhetorical.”147
Even the risk/utility test, they pointed out, threatened to trigger category liability, since it imposed no internal constraint on how drastically defective the
defendant’s design could be.148
The solution to the threat posed by category liability, Henderson and
Twerski argued, was the addition of a “reasonable alternative design” requirement to the risk/utility test.149 This proposal was deeply controversial, and led to
a flurry of scholarship debating its merits.150 Ultimately it became part of the
Third Restatement.151 In addition to requiring that the plaintiff establish defect

143 Another example is Pietrone v. American Honda Motor Co., 235 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1987), in
which the plaintiff was riding a motorcycle when a car crashed into her leg. The plaintiff alleged
merely that the design of the motorcycle caused her injury, without specifying a way in which it
could have been designed differently so as to prevent it. Id. at 139; Henderson and Twerski,
supra note 125, at 1293.
144 Harvey M. Grossman, Categorical Liability: Why the Gates Should Be Kept Closed, 36 S. TEX.
L. REV. 385, 386 (1995) (noting “widespread hostility on the part of courts and commentators”).
145 Henderson and Twerski, supra note 125, at 1292; Grossman, supra note 144, at 386 (noting
that “[t]he cases in which it was urged have rejected it with virtual unanimity” and that “[a] few
abberational cases that embraced the doctrine were eviscerated by subsequent litigation”). See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965) (“Good tobacco is not unreasonably
dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful.”).
146 Henderson and Twerski, supra note 125, at 1295; REST. 3D OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 2 cmt. e Part IV.D.
147 Id. at 1295.
148 Id. at 1316–19.
149 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1514, 1520–21 (1992).
150 Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Defining the Boundaries of Alternative Design under the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: The Nature and Role of Substitute Products in Design Defect Analysis, 63 TENN L
REV 329, 332–333 & n.19 (1996) (collecting cites).
151 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b).
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by reference to an alternative design, the Restatement offered a list of factors to
be used in considering “whether an alternative design is reasonable and
whether its omission renders a product not reasonably safe.”152 These include,
among others, the relative advantages and disadvantages of the alternative
design, including how it would impact the product’s cost, “longevity, maintenance, repair, and esthetics.”153
In an illustration, the Restatement hypothesizes a case in which a plaintiff
is injured in a car accident he alleges would have been less severe if he had
been driving a full-size rather than a compact car.154 Such a plaintiff, the
Restatement says, has not shown that the car is defective, because the alternative design (a heavier, larger car) would involve trade-offs in cost and fuel
efficiency, and “eliminating smaller automobiles from the market would
unduly restrict the range of consumer choice among automobile designs.”155
The problem need not be expressed in the Restatement’s terminology of reasonable alternative design; one could just as easily say that a compact car’s
safety must be evaluated by reference to other compact cars rather than to
larger full-size cars.
Several of the leading cases relied on by the Third Restatement grappled with
this problem in the automotive context. In Driesonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,
for example, the plaintiff was riding in the front seat of a Volkswagen microbus
that crashed into a telephone pole at about 40 miles per hour.156 The microbus, an
iconic design of the 1960s, had no forward crumple zone at all, since engine was
in the rear and the front seats were just behind the bumper.157 The plaintiff argued
that this constituted a design defect, as it rendered the passengers vulnerable in
relatively low-speed front end collisions, and suggested as an alternative design
the “standard American made vehicle . . . with an engine in front and with a long
hood.”158 The court, relying on Dyson, held that comparing the microbus with a
standard sedan would be just as wrong as comparing a standard sedan with a
convertible.159 In each case, customers sacrificed safety in exchange for some

152 Id. at § 2 cmt. f.
153 Id.
154 Id. at Ill. 9.
155 Id.
156 489 F.2d 1066, 1068 (4th Cir. 1974). See also Cupp, Jr., supra note 150, at 347 (discussing
Driesonstok); Aaron D. Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground between Rules and Standards in
Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 521, 578–85 (1982) (same).
157 489 F.2d at 1073–74.
158 Id. at 1074.
159 Id.
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other feature, either “openness” or “additional cargo and passenger space” in a
relatively cheap, compact, maneuverable car.160 A sedan, the court noted, has “a
different nature and utility,” making it an improper basis for a conclusion that the
microbus was defectively designed.161
And if category liability is doctrinally impermissible, then surely category
immunity would be as well. In other words, it has never been open to a defendant to argue that although their product may have had a defect, it should
nonetheless be immune from liability because the product is much safer overall
than some other category of product that achieves the same purpose.162 To
perhaps belabor the point, a defective airbag does not enjoy immunity from
liability simply because a car equipped with airbags is statistically much safer
than a car without them. For the same reason, it is hard to see why autonomous
vehicles should enjoy any degree of immunity from liability simply because they
may be safer in the aggregate than conventional vehicles.
Of course, not every product is in a “category” of its own. A convertible feels
like a category, while a car that lacks a shoulder belt in its rear middle seat does
not.163 Alcoholic beverages, handguns, cigarettes, and above-ground pools have
all been called categories.164 Just where the line is drawn is not entirely clear, in
large part because the idea of category liability is not something the parties raise
as an issue in the vast majority of products liability cases. It is, rather, lurking in
the idea of defect, as several commentators have observed.165 In general, plaintiffs are more successful alleging a defect and a reasonable alternative design
(and therefore avoiding the problem of category liability) when the challenged
aspect of the design is not visible or salient and when its elimination does not
significantly change the product’s cost or functionality. So, for example, the
placement of a gas tank, the use of a particular combustible gas to inflate an
airbag, and the design of an ignition switch could all be defects without the
doctrines of category liability or reasonable alternative design presenting any

160 Id.
161 Id. Like Larsen, the case was decided under negligence principles, but the court noted that
the outcome would have been the same under products liability. Id. at 1068 n.2.
162 Abraham and Rabin, supra note 103, at 145–46 (“[P]roducts liability law has never gauged
the reasonableness of a design by comparison to designs that have been rendered obsolete. A
chainsaw’s trigger guard may be defectively designed even if the design is twice as safe as a saw
without any guard at all; and depending on its side effects, an MRI machine may be defectively
designed even if it is twice as safe as the X-ray machine that it supersedes.”).
163 Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 131 S.Ct. 1131 (2011).
164 Grossman, supra note 144, at 392–93.
165 Id.; Henderson and Twerski, supra note 125.
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obstacle; nobody argues that an airbag inflated by ammonium nitrate is a
distinct category of product.
Against this backdrop, the gap between a conventional vehicle like those
that surround us today and Waymo’s “firefly,” which lacks a steering wheel or
pedals and operates by computer alone,166 feels like the gap between two
product categories. Or, to put it another way, the “defect” of relying on a
human driver feels so big that it is arguably no defect at all, merely an inherent
feature of what we have always known as an automobile.

3 Custom evidence
Another doctrine that limits the extent to which parties can rely on cross-product
arguments on defect is tort law’s treatment of custom evidence. Because the
history of automobile safety has been one of incremental improvements that
have led to exponential increases in the safety of motor vehicle travel, older cars
are generally less safe than newer ones.167 When safety technologies are introduced, they are rarely made standard equipment on all models at once. More
commonly, a manufacturer will release a new safety feature on higher-end
models, as is happening now with advanced low-level automation like automatic emergency braking and lane departure warning. With most technological
advancements, there is thus a class of people who are injured in crashes that
would not have occurred (or whose severity would have been greatly reduced) if
they had bought cars with the latest safety features available. When these
plaintiffs sue car manufacturers, they argue that the absence of the safety
feature in question rendered their car defective. These suits typically fail.
Electronic stability control (ESC) was an early form of low-level automation
that represented a significant breakthrough in preventing accidents rather than
mitigating their effects. ESC senses when a car is losing control in a turn and
automatically, selectively applies the brakes to one or more wheels to prevent
the car from skidding off the road.168 ESC was first offered in 1997 by MercedesBenz.169 By 2000, it was standard on most BMW and Mercedes cars, the Cadillac

166 Waymo Team, From post-it note to prototype: The journey of our Firefly (June 12, 2017),
https://medium.com/waymo/from-post-it-note-to-prototype-the-journey-of-our-firefly30569ac8fd5e (last visited July 25, 2019).
167 See CHARLES J. KAHANE, NHTSA, Lives Saved by Vehicle Safety Technologies and Associated
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 1960 to 2012, DOT HS 812 069, at x–xi (Jan. 2015).
168 Id. at 48–49.
169 Id. at 48.
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Seville, and a few luxury cars made by GM.170 During this period the NHTSA
issued several reports assessing the effectiveness of the technology;171 in 2004
the agency reported that it could save around 10,000 lives annually if it was
included on every car.172 Based on this data, NHTSA decided in 2007 to require
that all passenger cars include ESC as standard equipment by 2012, with a
gradual phase-in applying in the interim.173
Meanwhile, people were dying in crashes that could have been prevented by
ESC. I have been able to find seven published opinions resolving cases in which
plaintiffs alleged that their cars were defective by virtue of not including ESC.174
In each case, the plaintiff lost.175 Six of these cases were tried to a jury, all of
whom returned verdicts for the defense on plaintiffs’ design defect claims
relating to ESC.176
Jae Kim v. Toyota Motor Corp., which reached the California Supreme Court,
illustrates the problem of custom evidence particularly nicely. The plaintiff in
Jae Kim was paralyzed in an accident he argued would have been prevented if
170 Id. at 48.
171 Id. at 49 n.151 (collecting cites).
172 Jennifer N. Dang, NHTSA, Preliminary Results Analyzing the Effectiveness of Electronic
Stability Control (ESC) Systems, DOT HS 809 790 (Sept. 2004), http://www.nhtsa.gov/cars/
rules/regrev/evaluate/809790.html [https:// perma.cc/PBS6-DKCQ].
173 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Electronic Stability Control Systems; Controls and
Displays, 72 Fed. Reg. 17236 (April 6, 2007) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571 & 585).
174 There are certainly many more cases that have been filed and settled. See, e. g. Order
Approving Settlement and Final Judgment, Benavides v. Chrysler Group LLC, No. 2:14-CV00465, Dkt. #39 (S.D. Tex. November 20, 2015); Agreed Final Judgment, Garcia v. Nissan
Motor Co., No. 7:05CV00059, Dkt. #48 (S.D. Tex. September 7, 2006).
175 See Jae Kim v. Toyota Corp., 424 P.3d 290, 293 (Cal. 2018) (affirming jury verdict for
defense); Hinkle v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:11-24-DCR, 2013 WL 2285447, at *3 (E.D. Ky. May 23,
2013) (noting jury’s verdict in favor of defendant on design defect claim); May v. Ford Motor Co.,
No. 09-165-GFVT, 2010 WL 5391605, at *2 (E.D. Ky. December 22, 2010); (granting summary
judgment for defendant on plaintiff’s design defect claim); Cambron v. Ford Motor Co., No.
B225122, 2012 WL 34233, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. January 9, 2012) (noting jury’s rejection of plaintiff’s
design defect theory); Fleurime v. Ford Motor Co., No. 14 FJVR 6–2, 2013 WL 8642137 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. September 25, 2013) (jury verdict in favor of defense on design defect claim); Gallagher v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 238 S.W.3d 157, 160 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (affirming jury verdict in favor of
defendant and denial of plaintiff’s motion for new trial); Hamid v. Lexus, 369 S.W.3d 291, 300–
01 (Tex. App. 2011) (affirming jury verdict in favor of defendant and trial court’s instruction that
jury could presume that car was not defective because it complied with applicable safety
regulations).
176 Only May v. Ford Motor Co. was resolved differently. In that case, the court granted
summary judgment for the defendant due to inadequacies in the plaintiff’s proposed expert
testimony. May v. Ford Motor Co., No. 09-165-GFVT, 2010 WL 5391605, at *2 (E.D. Ky. December
22, 2010).
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his 2005 Toyota Tundra had been equipped with ESC. (It was available as an
optional add-on but he did not purchase it).177 Kim’s argument on defect was
straightforward: ESC would have cost Toyota about $300 to $350 per vehicle and
its benefits outweighed its cost.178 Toyota, on the other hand, elicited testimony
that no other manufacturer offered ESC as a standard feature on a pickup truck
in 2005, and in fact the Toyota Tundra was the first pickup truck to offer ESC as
an option.179 The jury was instructed to apply the risk-benefit test, and it
concluded that the car did not have a design defect.180
On appeal, Kim argued that the trial court had erred in admitting Toyota’s
evidence of industry custom, which he argued should be irrelevant in evaluating
the defectiveness of a design under the risk-benefit test. After all, if a design is
defective in that it “creates preventable danger that is excessive in relation to
[its] advantages,”181 what difference does it make whether every other manufacturer has the same design? As the court noted, it is possible that “the entire
industry has ‘unduly lagged’ in adopting feasible safety technologies.”182
Indeed, a line of California appellate court cases had held that evidence of
industry custom was irrelevant and thus inadmissible in products liability
cases.183
The court affirmed, holding that the challenged evidence was admissible,
not as dispositive evidence that the product was not defective, but because
“competing manufacturers’ independent design decisions may reflect their
own research or experience in balancing safety, cost, and functionality, and
thus shed some light on the appropriate balance of safety risks and benefits.”184

177 Jae Kim v. Toyota Motor Corp., 424 P.3d 290, 293 (2018).
178 Id. at 294.
179 Id. In what must have been a risky strategic decision, Kim elected to call Toyota’s product
planning manager as an adverse witness. The manager admitted that the company had by 2005
decided to include ESC on all SUVs, and that an engineer had recommended they do the same
with pickups, due to their similar rollover risks. But he also testified that pickup truck buyers
were “price sensitive and uninterested in [ESC], and that none of Toyota’s competitors were
offering [ESC] as either standard or optional equipment on their 2005 pickup truck models.” Id.
180 Id. at 295.
181 Id. at 294.
182 Id. at 300 (quoting The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932)).
183 Id. at 295–97. The same issue comes up in negligence cases and was the subject of intense
debate and disagreement among courts until the rule of The T.J. Hooper, which treats custom
evidence as relevant but not dispositive, gradually became the majority position. See Richard A.
Epstein, The Path to “The T. J. Hooper”: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 16–38 (1992) (tracing this history).
184 Id. at 299.
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This holding, the court noted, aligned it with the majority of states that have
considered the issue, as well as the Third Restatement.185
The connection between this doctrine and the idea of category liability was
made explicit by defense counsel, who argued in closing that “the Kims’ theory
that the 2005 Toyota Tundra contained a design defect ‘meant that every 2005
pickup was defective.’”186 The court of appeals criticized this argument sharply,
calling it “‘a prime example’ of when industry custom and practice would not be
relevant” because “[a]ll manufacturers may be producing an unsafe product.”187
The Supreme Court was less concerned. The “premise is correct,” it argued, “but
the conclusion is somewhat overstated.” “Evidence of industry custom and
practice,” the court concluded, “may in some cases illuminate whether the
product embodies excess preventable danger, given the trade-offs between
competing design choices.”188
Ultimately, the jury was not of course required to explain why it concluded
that Kim’s car was not defective by virtue of not including ESC. But the ability to
introduce evidence that no pickup truck on the market included it must at least
represent a thumb on the scale in favor of the defense. Thus while the court paid
lip service to Learned Hand’s insistence in The T.J. Hooper that “a whole calling
may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices,”189 it was
perfectly comfortable with the jury being told to compare the car at issue with
other pickup trucks and not with the more advanced, higher-end sedans and SUVs
that already included ESC. It was not unusual in reaching this conclusion.190
Two of the California appellate cases discussed in Kim shed further light on
the problem of custom evidence. In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., the plaintiff’s
Ford Pinto was rear-ended at low speed and burst into flames, killing her and
severely injuring her son.191 Facing a litany of bad facts and a host of ways it
could have fixed the Pinto’s alleged defects at extremely low cost,192 Ford tried
185 Id. at 299 n.5 (collecting cites).
186 Id. at 302.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 60 F.2d at 740.
190 Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REV. 285, 299 (2008)
(“Under the prevalent product-liability regime, a manufacturer’s conformity with the relevant
industrial custom is admissible as evidence tending to prove that its product was safe and not
defectively designed.”); David G. Owen, Proof of Product Defect, 93 KY. L.J. 1, 8–9 (2004) (“A
great majority of jurisdictions maintain that a manufacturer’s compliance or noncompliance
with industry custom is some evidence that the product was or was not defective.”).
191 Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 772 (1981).
192 Id. at 774–776. (noting various design changes that “would have enhanced the integrity of
the fuel tank system at relatively little cost per car”).
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to defend itself by arguing, among other things, that the Pinto’s “design and
manufacture matched the average quality of other automobiles” and did not
substantially deviate from the industry custom.193 In Buell-Wilson v. Ford Motor
Co., the plaintiff was severely injured when her Ford Explorer rolled over and the
roof collapsed.194 The plaintiff’s allegations of defect focused on the Explorer’s
high rollover risk and the various low-cost modifications Ford could have made
to ameliorate it.195 Ford sought to present expert testimony on how the
Explorer’s rollover rate compared with that of other, similar cars, with the aim
of showing that the Explorer was “a reasonably safe vehicle that is not unusually prone to roll over in comparison to other vehicles.”196
Both cases held that the defendant’s proposed custom arguments were
irrelevant, and both were overruled by Jae Kim.197 The upshot is that today,
California courts hold that it is it appropriate for juries to consider a car’s safety
relative to other comparable cars, and not just how safe it could have been had it
been designed differently. Against this backdrop, it would seem hard to make
the argument that a conventional vehicle is defective by virtue of not including
optional, advanced safety features like automatic emergency braking, lane keeping assist, or even drowsiness alerts that help correct human foibles.198

B Efficiency
From a purely utilitarian perspective, tort law’s relentless focus on defect is
troublingly myopic. Who cares if Tesla’s Autopilot could have been improved in
some incremental way that would have prevented three fatalities if it can save
193 Id. at 803.
194 Buell-Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Cal. App. 4th 525, 531 (2006).
195 As in Grimshaw, Buell-Wilson unearthed a host of bad facts for Ford. In particular, Ford
knew the Explorer had stability problems, and ignored pleas from its own engineers to make
changes to its design. Id. at 536–38.
196 Id. at 544.
197 Jae Kim, supra note 177, at 301 n.6.
198 I have been able to find one case in which a plaintiff made this argument. In Dashi v.
Nissan North America, Inc., the plaintiff was struck head on by another car while making an
illegal u-turn. 445 P.3d 13, 14–15 (Az. Ct. App. June 13, 2019). She argued that the other car was
defective by virtue of not including features like automatic emergency braking and forward
collision warning, which she argued would have prevented the crash. Id. at 15. The Arizona
court of appeals dismissed the case as preempted by the NHTSA’s 2017 decision, in response to
a petition for rulemaking, not to mandate the inclusion of such features in all cars. Id. at 20–21;
see also NHTSA, Denial of Petition for Rulemaking, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards:
Automatic Emergency Braking, 82 Fed. Reg. 8391–01 (January 25, 2017).
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tens of thousands every year? To the welfare economist, the appropriate question is not whether Autopilot was “defective,” but rather whether imposing
liability will help encourage an efficient allocation of resources. With this concern in mind, one should ask how society might most efficiently accomplish the
task of personal transportation.199 Just as the NHTSA was able to conclude that
requiring ESC would lead to a net gain in social welfare, an omniscient regulator
might well conclude that replacing human drivers with autonomous ones would
do the same. To many commentators, that conclusion seems inescapable, even
though autonomous cars do not yet exist. These are important questions. But
they are not the questions with which tort law concerns itself.
The degree to which tort law generally and products liability law in particular are capable of promoting the efficient allocation of resources has long been
a source of controversy.200 For some, tort law’s various failures to promote
efficiency are reasons to abandon the idea that tort law should be understood
or evaluated instrumentally.201 For others, these shortcomings become reasons
to reform tort law in some way so that it can be made to promote efficient
deterrence.202 These arguments take many forms and take aim at various aspects
of tort law, from the institutional competency of courts generally to determine
what constitutes an efficient precaution,203 to the justifiability of particular
doctrines large and small. For those who are committed to the idea that the
tort system should be understood and evaluated as a system that promotes
efficiency, the chief problem with tort law’s treatment of innovation has

199 Shavell, supra note 103, at 2 (“The social objective . . . is assumed to be the usual utilitarian
goal associated with economic analysis of accidents, namely the maximization of the benefits
parties obtain from their activities, here traveling in their vehicles, less the costs of achieving
safety together with those of accidents themselves.”).
200 See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 544–60 (2003)
(surveying the debate).
201 See, e. g. Richard W. Wright, The New Old Efficiency Theories of Causation and Liability, 7 J.
TORT L. 65 (2014).
202 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, HARV. L. REV.
1437, 1492 (2010) (proposing the contemplation of “[l]egislative change . . . that would limit or
eliminate product liability in certain industries or for certain widely sold products”); see also
Goldberg, supra note 200, at 546–53 (distinguishing between interpretive and prescriptive
versions of economic deterrence theory).
203 Polinsky and Shavell, supra note 202, at 1440 (arguing that the “beneficial effects of
product liability . . . are, for many products, likely to be outweighed by the litigation and
related costs of product liability”); Henderson, supra note 136, at 1534 (arguing that courts “are
not suited to the task of establishing specific product safety standards in the course of applying
general reasonableness tests to determine the adequacy of allegedly defective products brought
before them”).

194

A. B. Lemann

traditionally been that it is too quick to impose liability on new technologies. In
other words, to most efficiency theorists, tort law functions as an excessively
burdensome tax on innovation, in that it is too eager to punish new technologies
for breaking from the status quo.204
My focus here is on a less frequently noticed tendency of tort law that has
the same effect: it imposes too low a tax on established technologies. If, for
example, it is efficient to equip every car with ESC, then tort law should (if it
were to promote efficiency) treat every car without ESC as defective.205 Such cars
are, after all, just like the tugboats without radios in The T.J. Hooper: unduly
lagging. And yet for the doctrinal reasons canvassed above, tort law often
declines to impose liability in these circumstances.
As to ESC, regulatory analyses have always supported the idea that mandating its inclusion is clearly cost-justified.206 For instance, the NHTSA estimated the
cost of the rule requiring ESC as ranging from $180,000 to $450,000 per life
saved.207 The agency also estimated that ESC would prevent between 46,000 and
65,000 non-fatal injuries and prevent between $376 million and $535 million in
property damage and travel delays.208 On the other side of the ledger, the
technology was calculated to increase the cost of each new passenger car by
$90.30 (on average) and to require the use of an additional 2.6 gallons of fuel over
the entire lifetime of the car.209 The rule requiring ESC, the agency concluded, “is
extremely cost-effective,” so much so that its cost-effectiveness compared favorably with the rules requiring advanced airbags and center seat shoulder belts.210

204 George L. Priest, The Effects of Modern Tort Law on Innovation and Economic Growth, in
RULES FOR GROWTH: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND GROWTH THROUGH LEGAL REFORM 273, 273
(2011) (arguing that tort liability “has operated as a tax . . . without commensurate benefit to
consumers” and that “[t]he effect of expanded tort liability has been to suppress innovation and
reduce U.S. economic growth”); Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public
Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277–337, 278 (1985) (arguing that tort law is
“imprudently biased against many progressive, risk-reducing . . . technologies” and that “[t]his
bias significantly hinders our progress towards a healthier, safer environment”).
205 Ellen Wertheimer, Unavoidably Unsafe Products: A Modest Proposal, 72 CHI-KENT L. REV.
189, 195, 199 (1996) (arguing that manufacturers should bear the costs of injuries caused by
unavoidably unsafe products because “[a]ny calculation which fails to take such costs into
account allows the manufacturer to reap the benefits of the product without having to confront
its costs”).
206 NHTSA, supra note 173, 72 Fed. Reg. at 17297. See also NHTSA, FMVSS No. 126: Electronic
Stability Control Systems, Final Regulatory Impact Analysis (Mar. 2007).
207 Id. (The range results in part from different rates used to discount figures to present value).
208 Id.
209 Id. at 17298.
210 Id. at 17297.
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And yet, as discussed above, plaintiffs did not generally succeed in holding
manufacturers liable for declining to equip their cars with ESC.211
The history of litigation over airbags provides another telling example. The
development and adoption of airbags is a much more complex story than that of
ESC; it spans many decades and involves technological development,
Congressional intervention, public pressure, and a complicated series of administrative rules.212 In its broadest strokes, though, it fits a similar pattern: a costjustified technology213 is developed and gradually incorporated into passenger
vehicles, during which time people who buy cars without the technology are
killed. As with ESC, this situation triggered a spate of “no airbag” cases, in
which plaintiffs argued that their cars were defective in design by virtue of not
including technology whose adoption would seem to be compelled by the risk/
utility test.
Many of these cases were decided on preemption grounds, and ultimately
the Supreme Court held in Geier v. American Honda Motor Corp. that state
common law suits that sought to impose a duty on manufacturers to include
airbags were preempted by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, which at
the time expressly gave manufacturers a choice of which type of “passive
restraint” to adopt, with airbags being one of several options.214 Cases that
predated Geier were often resolved on preemption grounds without mention of
the substantive merits of the plaintiffs’ claims.215 In some cases, however, courts
also addressed the idea of a “no airbag” claim from a products liability

211 See supra notes 174–190 and accompanying text.
212 See generally MASHAW AND HARFST, supra note 131; see also Geier v. American Honda
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 875–81 (2000); KAHANE, supra note 167, at 121–22.
213 The cost-effectiveness of airbags has been a subject of controversy since at least the 1970s.
More recent work supports the idea that airbags are clearly cost-justified, even if perhaps less so
than the NHTSA’s initial estimates predicted. According to one analysis, driver’s side airbags
cost $24,000 per “quality adjusted life year” saved. John D. Graham et al., The Cost-effectiveness
of Air Bags by Seating Position, 278 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOC. 1418 (1997); see
also Kimberly M. Thompson, Maria Segui-Gomez & John D. Graham, Validating Benefit and Cost
Estimates: The Case of Airbag Regulation, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 803, 808 (2002). This figure
compares favorably with other public health interventions, like regular pap smears, radon
testing, and the 55-mph speed limit. Id. at 808.
214 529 U.S. at 886.
215 This is so even in cases where state courts held that plaintiffs’ claims were not preempted.
See Drattel v. Toyota Motor Corp., 699 N.E.2d 376 (N.Y. 1998); Minton v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc.,
684 N.E.2d 648 (Ohio 1997); Munroe v. Galati, 938 P.2d 1114 (Ariz. 1997); Wilson v. Pleasant, 660
N.E.2d 327 (Ind. 1995); Tebbetts v. Ford Motor Co., 665 A.2d 345 (N.H. 1995).
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perspective, typically holding that cars sold without airbags were not defective
as a matter of law.216
In Cooper v. General Motors, the Mississippi Supreme Court rejected the idea
that the absence of airbags could render a car defective in particularly forceful
terms. The court first noted that under the consumer expectations test, plaintiffs
“cannot expect an air bag to pop out knowing it did not exist.”217 Plaintiffs relied
instead on the then-recently-adopted risk/utility test. The court vehemently rejected
this argument. Rather than addressing the actual costs and benefits of airbags, the
court insisted that imposing liability for a manufacturer’s failure to install an “additional safety device” would be bad public policy, because it would subject manufacturers to a wide range of design standards in different states and thus make cars
“prohibitively expensive.”218 Of course the presence of federal regulations makes it
hard to draw strong conclusions from courts’ treatment of “no airbag” cases. But
there is precious little evidence that courts stood willing to impose liability on
manufacturers for their failure to adopt this now-universal efficient precaution.
Category liability is another barrier to the imposition of liability on older,
more dangerous technology. The rejection of category liability, after all,
amounts to an exception to the idea expressed long before The T.J. Hooper
that courts must in some cases stand willing to declare the practice of an entire
industry to be inadequate.219 That may be true as to minor details or alternative
designs of the same product, but the rejection of category liability tells us that,
paradoxically, the more significant the problem with the design of a product, the
more likely it is to be beyond the scrutiny of tort law.220 Several scholars
committed to the idea that tort doctrine should be made to promote efficiency
216 See Cooper v. General Motors, 702 So.2d 428 (Miss. 1997); Honda Motor Co. v. Kimbrel, 376 S.
E.2d 379, 384 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (“Safety belts rather than airbags would not be a defect . . . .”);
Hughes v. Ford Motor Co., 677 F. Supp. 76, 85 (D. Conn. 1987) (applying consumer expectations
test and holding that car without airbags was not defective because “the ordinary consumer who
purchased the 1974 Pinto, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community, could not
possibly have contemplated the presence of airbags.”); but see Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875
F.2d 816 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that claim is preempted but also reversing district court’s grant
of summary judgment on the ground that airbags did not offer a safety benefit when seatbelts
were used); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1987) (holding that no
airbag claim was not preempted and could go to the jury on the issue of defect).
217 702 So.2d at 443.
218 Id. at 443–44 & n.5.
219 Epstein, supra note 183, at 25–32.
220 Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIO ST L.J. 469, 475 (1987) (“If [the risk/
utility test] can be used to decide whether certain features of a machine tool should be replaced,
why cannot it be used to answer the question of whether entire classes of products, from
handguns to convertible automobiles to alcohol should be marketed at all?”).
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have thus argued that products that are inefficiently dangerous should be
exposed to liability, regardless of whether such liability would amount to a
prohibition on an entire product category.221
The consideration of custom evidence is also problematic from an efficiency
perspective. If what matters is creating liability rules that penalize the failure to
take precautions that cost less than the injuries they prevent, it is hard to see
why evidence that other cars don’t include ESC should be relevant. Indeed, this
has been the view of several efficiency theorists, who favor a categorical exclusion of custom evidence.222 Others argue, to the contrary (and less defensibly),
that custom should be exclusive evidence of due care, since to defer to industry
custom is to create a “market-based standard of liability,” and the market
should be presumed to have arrived at the efficient allocation of resources
whenever the parties have a preexisting relationship, like that of manufacturer
and consumer.223 It is harder to find efficiency theorists defending the

221 Steven Croley & Jon Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative Explanation for Recent
Events in Products Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 8, 84–90 (1991) (arguing that “courts should
complete the shift towards enterprise liability” because doing so leads to the removal from the
market of inefficiently unsafe products); Marc Z. Edell, Risk Utility Analysis of Unavoidably
Unsafe Products, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 623–655, 655 (1987) (arguing that courts should hold
manufacturers liable under the risk/utility test when their products are unavoidably unsafe and
do “more harm than good”); John L. Diamond, Eliminating the Defect in Design Strict Products
Liability Theory, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 529–552, 531 (1983) (arguing that courts should impose strict
liability regardless of defect because doing so would “encourage safety measures”); see also
Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 435, 443 (1979)
(noting argument that imposing liability without defect would create “a powerful and unremitting incentive . . . to adopt all appropriate safety devices”).
222 Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts, Innovation, and Growth, in RULES FOR GROWTH:
PROMOTING INNOVATION AND GROWTH THROUGH LEGAL REFORM 257, 528 (2011) (“These rules
deviate from the straightforward ‘result criterion’ that rejects custom-driven proxies and calls
for a direct assessment of the technologies’’ risks and benefits. Under this criterion, the
technology’s compliance or failure to comply with custom should play no role in determining
its users’ liability for tort damages. That is, defendants who comply with custom should receive
no preferential treatment from the torts system.”).”
223 Epstein, supra note 183, at 4, 37. Jason M. Solomon expresses a similar skepticism of the
appropriateness of tort law (and particularly juries) passing judgment on industry custom, but
his argument in favor of greater deference to custom is addressed to tort litigation only, and
relies less on faith in the efficiency of custom itself. Jason M. Solomon, Juries, Social Norms, and
Civil Justice, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1125, 1192 (2014) (“[C]ourts, in deciding wrongfulness in tort cases,
are not the ones to make the determination that companies ought to behave differently: that is
for legislatures or administrative agencies to do.”). Epstein extends this argument even to the
safety (or lack thereof) of nineteenth century mining operations, whose customs he says should
be assumed to be efficient, since there is a “tendency of consensual arrangements to optimize
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longstanding middle ground, under which custom is relevant but not dispositive
evidence of due care.
Efficiency theorists have made several defenses of these doctrines. One
defense of the protection afforded to product categories is that they usually do
not involve hidden risks and so might rationally be preferred by some consumers.224 Buyers of motorcycles or convertibles might, for example, place a particularly high subjective value on the feeling of the wind in their hair. On the other
hand, people have a tendency to underestimate product risks and undervalue
uncertain future harms.225 Consumers also ignore costs to third parties and may
discount even first party costs to the extent they are socialized.226
Another response is that when there is no precaution the manufacturer
could be induced to take, providing compensation to the customer in the
event of a crash would artificially decrease the cost of driving a motorcycle
and thus lead to inefficiently high levels of activity (motorcycle driving). Landes
and Posner made this argument in the context of design defect claims against
automobile manufacturers specifically.227 They argued that in many cases, the
more efficient precaution is not to make the car safer but rather to drive more
cautiously, and that having manufacturers compensate injured drivers would
only destroy the drivers’ incentive to slow down.228 Indeed, Shavell has made
this very point in connection with autonomous vehicles, arguing that having
manufacturers pay damages to their customers is undesirable because those
damages would artificially reduce the cost of driving and lead to overconsumption (in the form of driving too much).229

the joint welfare of the parties.” Epstein, supra note 183, at 18–19 (discussing Mayhew v.
Sullivan Mining Co., 76 Me. 100 (1884)).
224 Henderson and Twerski, supra note 125, at 1317.
225 Michael G. Faure, Economic Analysis of Product Liability, in EUROPEAN PRODUCT LIABILITY:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATE OF THE ART IN THE ERA OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 619, 654–55 (2016);
Richard J. Pierce Jr., Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33
VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1980) (listing “externalities, transaction costs, limited cognitive ability
of participants, and the relationship of market choices to preexisting patterns of wealth
distribution” as “factors that impair the ability of the market to channel safety spending into
patterns deemed optimal by all”). Pierce also noted that people assign different values to their
own lives depending on whether the risk they are exposed to is large or small, voluntary or
involuntary, or “associated with a particularly vivid or emotive event.” Id. at 1313.
226 Faure, supra, at 639–40; Henderson and Twerski, supra note 125, at 1275–76.
227 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability
Critical Issues in Tort Law Reform: A Search for Principles, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 554 (1985).
228 Id.
229 Shavell, supra note 103, at 3–4. Shavell’s solution is to have manufacturers pay damages to
the state instead. Id. at 4.
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This is not a persuasive account of how people decide when and how to
drive.230 It would, for example, be more efficient if people would simply stop
driving while drunk, an activity that kills around 10,000 people per year. That
the cost of drunk driving is not shifted onto car manufacturers does not seem to
be having any effect on drivers’ willingness to keep doing it. Meanwhile, devices
that can prevent a car from turning on if the driver is drunk were first developed
in 1969231 and even though they could be installed at relatively modest cost,232
no court has ever held a manufacturer liable for failing to include one in a
vehicle.233
To be clear, my argument is not that products liability creates no incentive
on the part of manufacturers to develop safer products,234 or that manufacturers

230 Indeed, the need to regulate activity levels is frequently cited by efficiency theorists as a
reason to prefer strict liability, on the theory that manufacturers would pass the cost on to their
customers, and that higher prices of things like motorcycles would do more to suppress
motorcycle riding than the vague sense that one might someday crash. See, e. g. Faure, supra
note 225, at 639–40; Henderson, supra note 136, at 1273–74 (noting argument that “[u]nder a
defect-free strict liability rule, the full costs of product-related injuries would be reflected in the
purchase prices of products, leading to more appropriate levels of consumption”).
231 Rapaczynski, supra note 101, at 22 n.53.
232 Patrick M. Carter et al., Modeling the Injury Prevention Impact of Mandatory Alcohol Ignition
Interlock Installation in All New US Vehicles, 105 AM J PUBLIC HEALTH 1028, 1031 (2015) (noting
that interlock devices cost about $400 per vehicle and estimating that they could save about
$343 billion in accident costs over 15 years, resulting in net economic benefits per equipped
vehicle after just 3 years); see also Rapaczynski, supra note 101, at 23 (“[T]he cost of the device is
low enough to make its absence into a self-evident violation of the Learned Hand formula
defining reasonable care.”).
233 Rapaczynski, supra note 101, at 23.
234 Indeed, in one study, researchers interviewed the heads of corporate safety offices at nine
“large manufacturing concerns” and found that, with a few exceptions, “product liability is the
most significant influence on product safety efforts.” GEORGE C. EADS & PETER REUTER, RAND
INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPORATE RESPONSES TO PRODUCT
LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION vii (1983). The study also found, however, that the signal
conveyed by products liability is “indistinct” and muffled by “long lags between the design
decision and the final judgment, . . . the inconsistent behavior of juries, and the rapid change in
judicial doctrine in the area.” Id. Ultimately, the authors concluded, “firms learned little from
the results of particular litigation about either specific design decisions or the process of design
decisionmaking.” Id. at vii-viii.
Another study of early improvements in motor vehicle safety concluded that products
liability law “is one of several forces that induce manufacturers to consider making pro-safety
decisions in the marketplace” and can sometimes “cause safety improvements to occur more
quickly than they would have occurred in the absence of liability.” John D. Graham, Product
Liability and Motor Vehicle Safety, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON
SAFETY AND INNOVATION 120 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds. ed. 1991).
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are never held liable for things like omitted or insufficient safety devices in
automobiles.235 Automobiles, given their cost and complexity, are arguably an
area where tort law is relatively loath to intervene on the side of efficiency, as
opposed to say, chainsaws or lawnmowers. It is also certainly true that judges
often speak in broadly utilitarian terms in explaining their decisions. Nor is it
fair to treat the tort system and the regulatory state as entirely distinct.236 My
claim is a more modest one: products liability’s defect requirement, refusal to
impose category liability, and insistence on evaluating the defectiveness of
products by reference to custom are hard to square with the goal of efficient
deterrence.237 That a car with a human driver would not be considered defective
is a prime example.238 Understanding why tort doctrine responds to technological advancement in this way requires looking beyond efficiency.

C Morality
Products liability’s tunnel vision in evaluating the defectiveness of a design is
hard to justify on efficiency grounds. Explaining it requires a turn to morality.
Why does tort law treat selling a Corvair but not a convertible as a wrong? Part
of the answer lies in the idea of consent, which is foundational to torts generally, from intentional torts to negligence to products liability.239 The buyer of a
convertible has necessarily consented to rollover risks in a way that the buyer of
a Corvair has not.240 Another part of the answer lies in the traditional idea that
torts are wrongs, and the sense in which selling a defective product that causes
injury is a wrong. Together these ideas suggest that manufacturers of autonomous vehicles should face the threat of liability when their products contain

235 See, e. g. Owen, supra note 126, at 294 n.13 (citing cases).
236 See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for Products Liability: A
Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1919, 1931 (2010).
237 See John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Responsibility, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 17, 22 (John Oberdiek, ed., 2014) (arguing
that “products liability law contains fundamental limitations on liability that are difficult to
justify by reference to . . . instrumental considerations” like efficient deterrence).
238 See Logue, supra note 103, at 6, 24–25 (proposing that manufacturers of vehicles of all
types be strictly liable for all car accidents because such a system would hasten the transition
from conventional vehicles to autonomous ones).
239 Mark A Geistfeld, The Value of Consumer Choice in Products Liability, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 781,
781 (2009).
240 NADER, supra note 129, at 2–32 (describing stabilty problems arising from various aspects
of the Corvair’s design).
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defects that cause injury, regardless of whether they may be safer, in the
aggregate, than conventional vehicles.
As Geistfeld has shown, the value of consumer choice was at the core of
early justifications for imposing products liability, which was seen as a necessary corrective to modern manufacturing and market processes’ tendency to
obscure products’ flaws and risks from consumer scrutiny.241 The consumer
expectations test of defectiveness gave consumer choice an explicit role in
products cases, as it treated products as defective when they were dangerous
to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer.242
Today the role of consumer choice (and thus consent) in design defect cases
is considerably murkier. Controversially, the Third Restatement strongly repudiated the consumer expectations test in favor of the risk/utility test, which has no
obvious connection to consumer choice. Moreover, the defense of assumption of
risk, which instantiates consent in negligence cases, does not apply in products
liability cases.243 Geistfeld has argued that the risk/utilty test, properly understood, vindicates consumer choice by giving effect to the choices consumers
would make if they had access to the same information as manufacturers. The
risk/utility test therefore contemplates liability for manufacturers’ failure to
install safety devices like ESC or airbags even though consumers plainly did
not choose them because, Geistfeld argues, consumers would have chosen them
if they had better access to information.244
One problem with this argument is that, as we have seen, products liability
has a spotty record when it comes to forcing automobile manufacturers to invest
in cost-justified safety technology; while the risk/utility test might seem to
compel the addition of features like airbags and ESC, doctrines like category
liability, reasonable alternative design, and custom evidence hinder the imposition of liability. A more profound problem is that there are instances in which
consumer choice and the rational, efficient risk/utility test diverge. Consumers
do not always choose efficient precautions, even when they have access to all
the information necessary to do so. A convertible is hard to justify on efficiency
grounds. So is a motorcycle.245 One solution is to assign some large value in the

241 Geistfeld, supra note 239, at 784–87.
242 Id. at 788. (citing REST. 2D OF TORTS § 402A).
243 Id. at 783.
244 Id. at 786–87, 790–91.
245 See Daniel J. Fagnant, Brice G. Nichols, and Kara M. Kockelman, Who Rides and Who Pays:
Comprehensive Assessment of Motorcycling Costs and Benefits in the United States, 2388
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH RECORD 37, 44–45 (2013) (“[T]he various benefits of motorcycles
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cost/benefit analysis to subjective goods, but this move risks a kind of free
market agnosticism, in which any product whose risk is known moves beyond
the reach of products liability.
Products liability law is arguably best seen as giving effect to the value of
consent not in the risk/utility test itself but in the various instances highlighted
above in which defendants escape liability despite failing to invest in costjustified precautions. When the value of consumer choice diverges from the
value of efficient precaution, products liability law errs on the side of giving
effect to consumer choice. Part of the explanation for the contours of reasonable
alternative design and category liability is this impulse. When an aspect of a
design like the inherently weaker retractable roof of a convertible is extremely
salient and is obviously part of the consumer’s individual calculus in selecting
the product, it is likely to be beyond the scrutiny of products liability.246
Complex, hidden design details that are not part of why anyone chooses a car,
like the inability of the Corvair’s steering column to absorb the force of a headon collision without impaling the driver, enjoy no such protection.247 In part this
can be seen as the de facto survival of the rule, repudiated in most jurisdictions,
that treated patent or “open and obvious” dangers as not actionable.248 The
more significant a feature, like the retractable top of a convertible, the more
clearly it appears that consumers have chosen to expose themselves to its risks.
This view of the role of consent in design defect cases supports tort law’s
rejection of category liability. Just as car manufacturers are not liable for all
crashes simply because train travel is safer, so manufacturers of conventional
vehicles should not be liable just because, in a hypothetical future world,
autonomous vehicles are safer. We consent to the risks that we will fall asleep

appear to be severely negated by added crash costs, which never return benefit-cost ratios
greater than 1, even for the skilled and helmeted riders . . . .”).
246 See Walters, supra note 142, at 458 (“The absence of this structural component is not only
obvious but chosen by consumers who desire the flexibility of a soft top that can be easily
detached, folded, and stowed for an open-air driving experience . . . .”); Curtis, supra note 142,
at 811 (“[I]f the vehicle was to be marketed at all . . . a compromise was necessary. If there be no
compromise and only the very safest can be marketed, there obviously would be no choice for
the buyer as the less safe options would be eliminated.”).
247 See, e. g., Larsen v. General Motors, 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); see also Keith N. Hylton,
The Law and Economics of Products Liability, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2457, 2458 (2013) (noting
that “[p]roducts liability law operates largely on products that have observable utility and
hidden risks,” and that “[t]his combination of features is unlikely to be regulated well by the
market”).
248 Epstein, supra note 220, at 474–76; REST. 3D OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d. Part
IV.C.
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or get distracted or drive drunk every time we get behind the wheel, even if
manufacturers have the means to eliminate these risks technologically.249
But if these observations are correct, why shouldn’t autonomous vehicle
manufacturers be immune from liability, as Geistfeld suggests, as long as their
products are significantly safer and they disclose whatever risk remains to
consumers in a transparent and understandable manner?250 Haven’t users of
Tesla’s Autopilot consented to the risk of being chauffeured around by an
inexperienced and erratic algorithm?
Not if Tesla’s autopilot is defective. To corrective justice and civil recourse
theorists, tort law is a law of wrongs.251 Products liability law “allows victims
who have been wrongfully injured by the seller of a defective product to invoke
the legal system to hold the seller accountable.”252 Somewhat ironically, the
concept of a design defect is easier to square with notions of fault that predated
the creation of products liability law than the older, conceptually simpler, idea
of a manufacturing defect.253 It is hard to see how the Coca-Cola bottler who
exercised due care has wronged the waitress who falls victim to the inevitable
one-in-a-million exploding Coke bottle.254 It is much easier to see how the
designers of the Shopsmith wronged Mr. Greenman when they selected for
their lathe an inadequate set screw.255 Indeed, plaintiffs include negligence
claims in many products liability cases, partly to ensure the relevance of evidence of the defendant’s bad behavior. Many landmark design defect cases
involving automobiles fit this pattern.256

249 See supra notes 231–233 and accompanying text.
250 Geistfeld, supra note 103, at 1654–60.
251 See, e. g. Goldberg, supra note 200, at 570 (describing views of corrective justice theorists);
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917 (2010).
252 Goldberg and Zipursky, supra note 236, at 1944.
253 G. Edward White, The Unexpected Persistence of Negligence, 1980–2000, 54 VAND. L. REV.
1337, 1348 (2001) (arguing that criteria for determining defectiveness in design cases are
“virtually identical to the criteria for determining ‘reasonable conduct’ in negligence cases”).
254 The majority opinion in Escola relied on an expansive interpretation of the idea of res ipsa
loquitur to reach this conclusion. 150 P.2d at 439–40.
255 377 P.2d at 899.
256 See, e. g. Hiroko Tabuchi & Neal E. Boudette, Automakers Knew of Takata Airbag Hazard for
Years, Suit Says, THE NEW YORK TIMES, February 27, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/
27/business/takata-airbags-automakers-class-action.html (last visited August 19, 2019);
Engstrom, supra note 112, at 328–31 (recounting key facts of GM ignition switch litigation,
which revealed that GM knew for years that certain ignition switches were prone to failure,
disabling the car’s power steering, brakes, and airbags, but took no action to fix the problem
and attempted to cover it up instead); Buell-Wilson, 141 Cal. App. 4th at 535–36 (“Long before
the Wilsons purchased their Explorer, Ford’s engineers knew that the vehicle’s design was
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Focusing on the wrongfulness of the challenged design helps explain products liability’s treatment of custom evidence. Custom evidence contains strong
whiffs of fault. A defendant’s compliance with custom tends to suggest the
exercise of ordinary care. So while custom evidence should technically be
irrelevant in asking whether a design is defective, courts have admitted it on
the arguably tenuous understanding that it helps “shed light . . . on the
adequacy of the design itself” by helping juries “consider whether a design is
safe enough, given the relative complexity of design decisions and the trade-offs
that are frequently required in the adoption of alternative designs.”257 These
legal niceties notwithstanding, it is hard to conclude that a design is defective
after being told that it is universal or nearly so. The jury in Jae Kim thus decided
that Kim’s Toyota Tundra was not defective by virtue of lacking ESC, after being
told that when Kim bought his car no pickup truck on the market included ESC.
The lack of ESC was no secret, of course, but as Geistfeld points out, consumer
choice alone does not absolve Toyota, since consumers often do not have the
information or ability to make informed decisions about complex safety features
like ESC or airbags.258 To treat custom as dispositive of due care, on the other
hand, would be problematic as well, as it would eviscerate the legal obligations
tort law imposes on industries and return us to the pre-Larsen (or even preMacPherson) days in which the free market status quo was the beginning and
end of a manufacturer’s responsibility to its customers.
It is admittedly not self-evident that morality requires a system built on
fault. It was once common to hear scholars making arguments from morality in
favor of enterprise liability, which eschews fault in favor of compensating
injured consumers.259 Consumers after all are innocent of any role in designing
or selling the products that injure them and thus arguably should not be made
unstable and prone to rollover . . . . Ford’s design engineers repeatedly requested Ford to widen
the track width and lower the center of gravity on the Explorer to increase its stability. However,
management declined to do so.”); Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 775–77 (“[T]he highest level of
Ford’s management made the decision to go forward with the production of the Pinto, knowing
that the gas tank was vulnerable to puncture and rupture at low rear impact speeds creating a
significant risk of death or injury from fire and knowing that ‘fixes’ were feasible at nominal
cost.”).
257 Jae Kim, 424 P.3d at 298.
258 Geistfeld, supra note 239, at 794.
259 See, e. g. White, supra note 253, at 1345–46, 1360; Wertheimer, supra note 205, at 194–95
(arguing that “fairness requires that manufacturers stand behind their products” by compensating those who are injured, regardless of whether the product is defective). Are we morally
responsible for the effects of our actions, even when those actions are in no way wrongful?
Intuitively, it seems easy to say no, even when the actions in question are ones that bring us
profit. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 237, at 22–23 (arguing that “[a] seller can cogently
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to bear their losses just because they aren’t traceable to defects in the products
that hurt them. To corrective justice theorists, though, tort law has always been
a system that concerns itself with wrongful losses, rather than losses – or need –
per se. This is what distinguishes it from distributive justice.260 Imposing liability on product categories without any showing of defect thus feels unfair; why
should a manufacturer be liable for a plaintiff’s fall off a well-built ladder?261
These observations suggest that manufacturers of autonomous vehicles
should not be immune from liability if their products are defective, regardless
of whether they are nevertheless safer than conventional vehicles. Focusing on
the wrongfulness of selling a defective product helps highlight, too, instances in
which manufacturers of autonomous vehicles should not be liable. Strict liability
has never been truly “strict” in the sense that plaintiffs are absolved of any
obligation to show defect and have only to prove that the defendant’s product
caused their injury. Selling a product that is unavoidably dangerous, tort law
has always recognized, is simply not wrong. An autonomous vehicle that
crashes should thus be liable only if the plaintiff can trace the crash to some
defect.262

III Application
What do these observations about the nature of products liability tell us about
how cases against autonomous vehicle manufacturers should be resolved? It is
worth recalling for a moment the incredible diversity of proposals for addressing
autonomous vehicle liability, which range from blanket immunity to strict
liability to repudiations of the tort system in favor of new compensation
schemes.263 One theme that is common to virtually all of this scholarship is
be deemed morally responsible for its product having caused an injury when the injury was an
avoidable consequence of selling the product”).
260 Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice, IOWA L.
REV. 515–624, 538 (1991).
261 Schwartz, supra note 221, at 444.
262 It is entirely possible that an insurance-like system of manufacturer enterprise liability like
that proposed by Abraham and Rabin would do a better job of providing both compensation
and efficient deterrence. See supra note 117. I am willing to admit that such a system might be a
desirable replacement for tort law from a normative perspective. It would be important to
understand and acknowledge, however, that in abandoning tort law we would be largely
jettisoning its valuable moral content. See Alexander B. Lemann, Coercive Insurance and the
Soul of Tort Law, 105 Geo. L.J. 55, 94–96 (2016).
263 See supra notes 115–121 and accompanying text.
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that our sense of how autonomous vehicle liability is to be handled should turn
on whether and to what degree autonomous vehicles are safer than conventional
ones.
To begin, some thoughts will be applicable to any case involving an autonomous vehicle. The doctrines of defect, category liability, reasonable alternative
design, and custom evidence suggest that autonomous vehicles should be
evaluated on their own merits, without regard to how much safer they are
than conventional vehicles. Just as a manufacturer cannot defend an allegation
of design defect by pointing out that its car is safer than a horse, so an
autonomous vehicle manufacturer should not be able to point to a conventional
vehicle in defending itself. Defective airbags, antilock brakes, ignition systems,
and seatbelts have all been evaluated by reference to their intended purposes
and the limits of current technology, not to older vehicles that lack such features
altogether.
The suggestion that autonomous vehicles should be evaluated on their own
merits is likely to be divisive, since it ignores broader utilitarian reasons for
preferring autonomous vehicles over conventional ones. These reasons may be
excellent. They may, some day in the not too distant future, form the basis for a
new Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard requiring that all passenger cars
include features like automatic emergency braking or forward collision warnings.264 That would, indeed, be a desirable function of the NHTSA. But tort law
is a law of wrongs, and it is entirely possible that an autonomous vehicle could
be defective, despite its being safer in the aggregate than a conventional one.
Similarly, a conventional vehicle does not become defective just because an
autonomous vehicle is safer.
The principle of consumer choice, which is given effect widely in tort law,
helps support this result. Consumers who choose to purchase and drive a car are
well aware of their own foibles. We fall asleep, get distracted, get drunk. Those
weaknesses have never triggered liability on the part of manufacturers, even
when technology to correct them has existed for decades.265 The flaws of an
algorithm, on the other hand, are to a meaningful extent hidden from view.
264 In response to a petition for rulemaking, the NHTSA in 2017 declined to propose regulations mandating the inclusion of these technologies, but noted that its denial was based on its
belief that pressure from various other organizations (including the Insurance Institute for
Highway Safety) would lead to the inclusion of these technologies in “substantially all light
vehicles.” The agency also noted that it would continue assessing whether a new standard
“might be needed in the future.” NHTSA, Denial of Petition for Rulemaking, Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards: Automatic Emergency Braking, 82 Fed. Reg. 8391–01 (January 25,
2017).
265 See supra notes 231–233 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, understanding whether and how an algorithm is likely to fail in performing the driving task has proved to be a vexing problem for the top minds in
computer science. The very complexity of the problem has supported calls for
taking responsibility for it away from our civil justice system, which is seen to be
poorly equipped to even attempt to understand emergent behavior on the part of
the algorithms that will drive us around. If this is true, it is hard to see why
consumers should be said to have accepted the risks involved, even if they are
provided with some sense of the statistical danger that remains when they are
relieved of the burden of driving. After all, one of the enduring lessons of Larsen
and its progeny is that manufacturers are not relieved of liability for design
defects simply because crash statistics are widely available and known to
consumers.
Just because an autonomous vehicle is involved in a crash, on the other
hand, doesn’t mean it is defective. Injuries caused by unavoidable errors in an
otherwise safe technology, like the failure of a tire to maintain its grip on icy
pavement, do not qualify as wrongs. Many scholars take the view that autonomous vehicle crashes will have this quality.266 It is, after all, possible that
autonomous vehicles will have a known, irreducible error rate and that it will
be impossible to trace the crashes that continue to occur to a discrete programming error or design decision.
It helps to consider this argument against the backdrop of the four fatalities
autonomous vehicles have so far caused. The fatal crashes involving Tesla’s
Autopilot, in particular, raise these issues most clearly, both because Tesla’s
customers were the ones killed and because Tesla has been very vocal in
defending itself by arguing that its Autopilot features are safer overall than
human drivers. Of those who have been killed by Tesla’s Autopilot, only
Walter Huang has so far filed suit. Joshua Brown’s family was reported to
have hired a lawyer to explore the possibility of suing Tesla in 2016.267 A year
later, the family released a statement that seemed to absolve Tesla of any blame
for the accident.268

266 See supra note 112.
267 Stephen Gandel, Tesla Autopilot Crash Victim’s Family Hired a Personal Injury Lawyer,
FORTUNE, Jul. 11, 2016, https://fortune.com/2016/07/11/tesla-autopilot-joshua-brown/ (last visited July 23, 2019).
268 Ryan Felton, Feds To Partially Blame Tesla’s Autopilot In Fatal Crash: Report, JALOPNIK,
Sept. 11, 2017, https://jalopnik.com/the-ntsb-to-partially-blame-teslas-autopilot-in-fatal-c1803136365 (last visited July 23, 2019) (“We heard numerous times that the car killed our son.
That is simply not the case . . . . People die every day in car accidents . . . . Joshua believed, and
our family continues to believe, that the new technology going into cars and the move to
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Many scholars have focused on the seeming difficulty of identifying the
defect in a machine learning algorithm that displays emergent behavior. If
proving a design defect requires this level of specificity, this will indeed prove
difficult. This is, after all, a way in which litigating the defectiveness of an
autonomous vehicle differs qualitatively from litigating the defectiveness of a
lathe, for example. It is easy for anyone to see that a different set screw should
have been used in the Shopsmith, but far harder for anyone to identify a
particular line of code or programming decision made by Tesla engineers that
killed Brown, Huang, or Banner.
More recently, there have been suggestions for how to avoid this seemingly
intractable problem, one familiar and doctrinal and the other more exotic and
technological. First is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Products liability has
ever since Escola had to struggle with seemingly inexplicable accidents, product failures that cannot be traced to a defect post hoc. At least, we were able to
say of the exploding Coke bottle that lacerated the waitress’s hand, such a
thing simply should not happen in the absence of some sort of defect, and the
fact that we aren’t able to reconstruct exactly what sort shouldn’t doom her
case.269
Bryan Casey has persuasively argued that we should see res ipsa loquitur as
a valuable tool to fill gaps in our understanding of why machines malfunction.270 The case for res ipsa loquitur would appear to be the strongest for Walter
Huang, whose Tesla suddenly veered off the highway and into a crash attenuator at 71 mph.271 While his family has only recently filed suit and the NTSB’s
investigation of the crash is ongoing, it seems safe to assume, following many of
the experts in the field, that investigators will not be able to identify a discrete
error in the code of the Autopilot system that led to the crash. Should that
matter? As Casey points out, if a human driver suddenly veered off the road and
there was nothing physically wrong with his car, we would not have trouble
concluding that he had breached the relevant standard of conduct, even if we
could not scrutinize a line-by-line transcript of his thought processes to identify

autonomous driving has already saved many lives. Change always comes with risks, and zero
tolerance for deaths would totally stop innovation and improvements.”).
269 Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company, 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
270 Casey, supra note 104; see also Vladeck, supra note 103, at 142 (arguing that “an inference
of defect is reasonably drawn when a product fails, even when a defect cannot be determined
by engineers, when the failure occurs with some frequency and the failure follows a common
pattern. In those circumstances, courts routinely apply principles of res ipsa loquitur and
conclude that the car, not the driver, is at fault”).
271 NTSB, supra note 59.
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exactly why his behavior deviated so badly from expectation.272 We judge people
based on what they do, even when we can’t figure out why they did it.273
Such an argument might appear to rely on the autonomous vehicle/human
comparison that I have made it my goal in this paper to resist. One of the
elements of res ipsa loquitur, after all, requires the plaintiff to show that the
event that caused her injury is something that would not normally happen
without negligence. And how is our sense of what “normally” happens in an
autonomous vehicle informed except by reference to a conventional vehicle?
This is a tricky problem, and it does seem hard to instruct a jury to draw
inferences based on their sense of what’s normal in a case involving one of
the first ever fatalities caused by a machine learning algorithm.
On the other hand, this problem too dates back to Escola, when the court
struggled to explain why the plaintiff should be entitled to a res ipsa loquitur
instruction despite seemingly uncontroverted testimony about the care exercised
by the glassmakers who produced the Coke bottle at issue.274 The concept of
defect was supposed to solve this problem, and cases of manufacturing defect
address it in a straightforward way. Manufacturing defects have always been
thought to be categorically inapposite to autonomous vehicle liability, since the
algorithms that drive the cars are uniform. But maybe the idea of a manufacturing defect isn’t completely inapposite after all. The idea of holding manufacturers responsible for the product failures resulting from an irreducible error
rate, in which some tiny subset of a line of products fails to perform according to
expectations, feels conceptually analogous. The problem may not have been
that the code in Walter Huang’s car was any different from that of any other
Tesla, but rather that it inexplicably swerved into a barrier, just like the Coke
bottle inexplicably exploded. We believe there must have been some physical
deformity in that particular Coke bottle (unlike the code in Huang’s Tesla), but

272 Casey, supra note 104, at 34 (“[T]he law doesn’t need to understand how the algorithms in
our brains work to make sense of our behavior . . . . Indeed, there seems as much reason to fear
that the law will be confounded by tomorrow’s ‘neural networks’ as it is today by the neuronal
firing of human brains–which is to say, none at all.”).
273 Casey and David Vladeck both analogize inexplicable autonomous crashes to the recent
litigation against Toyota and Lexus in which plaintiffs argued that their vehicles experienced
sudden, uncontrollable acceleration. Despite exhaustive inquiry, engineers were unable to find
a defect that caused the problem. A jury, however, applied res ipsa loquitur and held the
manufacturers liable. This example leads Casey and Vladeck to conclude that “existing products liability law is well-positioned to address cases where the evidence strongly suggests a
defect, but technology cannot isolate the cause.” Vladeck, supra note 103, at 142–43; see also
Casey, supra note 104, at 35–36.
274 150 P.2d at 440.
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ultimately it may not matter. If a plaintiff is wronged when a seemingly innocuous bottle of Coke inexplicably explodes in her hand, isn’t a plaintiff also
wronged when a seemingly functional Tesla inexplicably veers off the road at
high speed?
These observations highlight why Huang’s case may be stronger than those
of Brown and Banner, both of whose cars collided with tractor-trailers making
left turns across their paths. The NTSB noted in its final report on the Brown
crash that no manufacturer had at that time been able to develop an automatic
emergency braking system capable of identifying and responding to crossing
traffic. This is presumably why Tesla instructed customers to use Autopilot only
on divided, limited-access highways. Calling such a flaw a defect may be
stretching the concept too far.275
On the other hand, Tesla knew the limits of its own system and arguably
should have programmed those limits into Autopilot as hard constraints. This
would include making it impossible to use Autopilot on anything less than a
limited-access highway, which after all is the only environment in which it is
supposed to be used. It is possible that this is a design defect. Such a change
would presumably not have been expensive (Cadillac’s Super Cruise system
already works this way),276 although it arguably would reduce Autopilot’s utility
for the many people who, ignoring the warnings in the manual, use it on other
types of roads. Another arguable defect is Autopilot’s way of ensuring that
drivers are paying attention, which is easily tricked and only a rough proxy
for attentiveness. Tesla allowed drivers to remove their hands from the wheel for
long periods of time and to silence any warnings that sounded by replacing their
hands only briefly. Again, these are design decisions that can easily be evaluated ex post.
It is also certainly true that Tesla would have strong defenses available in all
of these cases. Tesla would presumably rely on product misuse, comparative
fault, or assumption of risk in arguing that each driver ignored instructions in
the manual clearly indicating that Autopilot is designed to be used by an
attentive driver and, in Brown and Banner’s cases, only on certain types of
roads.277 It could also seek contribution from other parties who helped cause
275 See REST. 3D OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d (noting that a reasonable alternative
design must be one that “could have been practically adopted at time of sale” and that “it may
be difficult for the plaintiff” to make this showing “[w]hen a defendant demonstrates that its
product design was the safest in use at the time of sale”).
276 See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
277 See REST. 3D OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 17. On the other hand, manufacturers’ duty is
based on the foreseeable uses of their products rather than the warnings and restrictions they
put in their instructions; a manufacturer “has a duty to prevent an injury caused by the
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certain of the crashes. The NTSB concluded that the driver of the truck in the
Brown accident should have yielded to Brown, and the Florida Highway Patrol
issued him a citation for his failure to do so.278 Huang’s car, moreover, collided
with a crash attenuator that had already been compressed by an unrelated
collision eleven days before.279 Huang presumably would have survived if the
attenuator had been replaced.280
Arguably, these cases are relatively easy in that they involve Level 2 automation, which relies on human oversight and so includes design features that
are inherently susceptible to evaluation by laypeople. On this score, the crash
that killed Elaine Herzberg, which involved a more highly autonomous Uber that
was being tested by a human operator, presents more of a challenge. Setting
aside for a moment the problems with the way the human oversight was
structured and performed (and Herzberg’s own arguably negligent behavior),
is it possible to identify a defect in the performance of the autonomous system
itself?
Following the Uber crash, investigators were able to review the algorithm’s
“thought process” after its sensors detected Herzberg pushing a bicycle across
the street. It struggled to decide what exactly it was seeing but, crucially, did not
slow down at all as it spent five seconds thinking about what to do.281 We would
have no problem concluding that a human driver was negligent in such circumstances. Isn’t it possible to conclude that an algorithm that drives so poorly is
defective? It may not be the case that programmers instructed the algorithm to
maintain speed when it could not identify a large object in the road, but if that is
in fact what it did then we (or a jury) should be able to conclude that it is
defective. As a reasonable alternative, the product’s designers could instruct it
(by whatever means they use) to slow down when it detects an object it thinks
might be a vehicle or a bicycle in its path. At the very least, it is hard to see why
existing tort concepts are so wholly inadequate to the task of post hoc evaluation that they need to be scrapped. It is also hard to see why we should not
stand ready to entertain the argument that Herzberg, Brown, Huang, or Banner
were wronged and deserve some form of redress.

foreseeable misuse of its product.” Id. § 2 cmt. p. (quoting Jurado v. Western Gear Works, 619
A.2d 1312, 1318 (N.J. 1993)).
278 See supra note 38.
279 NTSB, supra note 59, at 3.
280 Complaint, Huang v. Tesla, Inc., supra note 63, at 13–15 (naming State of California as a
defendant and alleging that the damaged attenuator was a “substantial factor” in Huang’s
death).
281 See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text.
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Conclusion
At some point in the future, highly autonomous vehicles will take responsibility
for most of our driving, delivering significant gains in safety and convenience.
Such a transformational shift in the way we get around is often taken to
necessitate an equally transformational shift in products liability law, which
many think will need to change if we are to encourage efficient investments in
autonomous vehicle adoption and development. But products liability law can
be understood and evaluated on moral as well as instrumental grounds, and on
that score, the four fatalities that have so far been caused by autonomous
vehicles help show that there is a strong case to be made for applying traditional
products liability concepts to this new technology, and for giving those who
have been and will be injured some way to hold manufacturers to account.
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